{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including openclaw.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-9q2p-vc84-2rwm in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade openclaw to 2026.3.7 or later.","what":"GHSA-9q2p-vc84-2rwm is a vulnerability in openclaw, published on 9 Mar 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-9q2p-vc84-2rwm and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-9q2p-vc84-2rwm is a vulnerability in openclaw, published on 9 Mar 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-9q2p-vc84-2rwm in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- openclaw (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 2026.3.7\n- openclaw (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 2026.3.7\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-9q2p-vc84-2rwm/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-9q2p-vc84-2rwm/index.md)","id":"GHSA-9q2p-vc84-2rwm","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-9q2p-vc84-2rwm/index.md","name":"GHSA-9q2p-vc84-2rwm","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["security_bypass"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":true,"product_category":"OpenClaw npm library","requires_auth":"low_privilege","summary":"Attackers can bypass allowlist security controls in OpenClaw by using shell comments to hide malicious command tails from persistence analysis.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"security_feature_bypass"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"OpenClaw's `system.run` allowlist analysis did not honor POSIX shell comment semantics when deriving `allow-always` persistence entries.\n\nA caller in `security=allowlist` mode who received an `allow-always` decision could submit a shell command whose tail was commented out at runtime, for example by using an unquoted `#` before a chained payload. The runtime shell would execute only the pre-comment portion, but allowlist persistence could still analyze and store the non-executed tail as a trusted follow-up command.\n\nLatest published npm version: `2026.3.2`\n\nFixed on `main` on March 7, 2026 in `939b18475d734ed75173f59507e3ebbdfe1992b7` by teaching shell tokenization and chain/pipeline analysis to stop at unquoted shell comments, so allow-always persistence now tracks only commands that the shell can actually execute. Normal real chained commands and quoted `#` literals continue to work.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.3.2`\n- Patched version: `\u003e= 2026.3.7`\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `939b18475d734ed75173f59507e3ebbdfe1992b7`\n\n## Release Process Note\n\nnpm `2026.3.7` was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.\n\nThanks @tdjackey for reporting.","ecosystems":["npm"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"OpenClaw: system.run allow-always persistence included shell-commented payload tails","id":"GHSA-9q2p-vc84-2rwm","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"npm","product":null,"products":[],"type":"security_feature_bypass","year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["2026.3.7"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"openclaw","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-9q2p-vc84-2rwm"},{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["2026.3.7"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"openclaw","purl":"pkg:npm/openclaw","source":"GHSA-9q2p-vc84-2rwm"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-03-09","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Attackers can bypass allowlist security controls in OpenClaw by using shell comments to hide malicious command tails from persistence analysis.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-9q2p-vc84-2rwm/"}