{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including grok-faf-mcp.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade grok-faf-mcp to 1.5.3 or later.","what":"GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332 is a path traversal vulnerability in grok-faf-mcp, published on 19 Aug 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, and only if a user opens a file or follows a link."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332 is a path traversal vulnerability in grok-faf-mcp, published on 19 Aug 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, and only if a user opens a file or follows a link.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- grok-faf-mcp (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 1.5.3\n- grok-faf-mcp (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 1.5.3\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332/index.md)","id":"GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332/index.md","name":"GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["data_read"],"network_reachable":"adjacent_or_local","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"MCP server library","requires_auth":"none","summary":"An attacker can read arbitrary local files, including secrets, by manipulating path arguments in grok-faf-mcp tools via prompt injection or direct calls.","user_interaction":"required","vuln_class":"path_traversal"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"### Summary\nSeveral `grok-faf-mcp` MCP tools accept a caller-controlled `path` argument and resolve it (`~` expansion + `path.resolve()`) straight into a filesystem read **without confining it to a trusted project directory**. An absolute path or `../` traversal is resolved and used as-is, so the server process can be made to read files outside the intended `.faf` project context. The only remaining limit is OS file permissions.\n\n### Affected tools\n`refresh_faf`, `faf_score`, `faf_get_orchestration_policy`, `refresh_blend` (and the shared `getProjectPath()` chokepoint feeding the `.faf` tools), plus the general-purpose `faf_read` / `faf_write` file tools (denylist-only; an absolute path still reached home-directory secrets, and `faf_write` could write outside the project). `refresh_faf` echoes the file contents verbatim back to the caller as \"fresh DNA\"; `faf_get_orchestration_policy` reflects values parsed out of the attacker-chosen file and echoes the resolved absolute path — confirming the read.\n\n### Impact\nAn MCP client — or an LLM prompt-injected via attacker-controlled content (a web page, README, ticket, or `.faf`) into issuing a tool call — can read any file the server process can read: SSH keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`), cloud credentials (`~/.aws/credentials`), `.env` files, source, `/etc/passwd`. This is a sensitive-information-disclosure (CWE-200) primitive that far exceeds the declared `.faf` project-context scope. The server runs over stdio, so the read is reached by a crafted tool call (e.g. a prompt-injected agent processing attacker-controlled content).\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **1.5.3** by confining every caller-supplied `path` before any filesystem access (`safe-path.ts`):\n- Reads are restricted to `.faf` / `.fafm` context files, so non-context files (secrets) are refused regardless of directory.\n- General file ops (`faf_read` / `faf_write`) are confined to the project root (cwd + system temp; override with `FAF_ALLOWED_ROOTS`).\n- Paths are canonicalized through symlinks (closing the symlink bypass); absolute paths and `../` escapes are rejected.\n\nUpgrade: `npm install -g grok-faf-mcp@1.5.3` (or `bunx grok-faf-mcp`).\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, run the server only against trusted local projects, and set `FAF_ALLOWED_ROOTS` (patched versions) to a single project directory for a hard directory boundary.\n\n### Credits\nDiscovered and responsibly reported via coordinated disclosure by **Zhihao Zhang** (Worcester Polytechnic Institute).","ecosystems":["npm"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"grok-faf-mcp has an arbitrary local file read via unconfined `path` argument in FAF tools","id":"GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"npm","product":null,"products":[],"type":"path_traversal","year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["1.5.3"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"grok-faf-mcp","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332"},{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["1.5.3"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"grok-faf-mcp","purl":"pkg:npm/grok-faf-mcp","source":"GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-08-19","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"An attacker can read arbitrary local files, including secrets, by manipulating path arguments in grok-faf-mcp tools via prompt injection or direct calls.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332/"}