{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including github.com/tendermint/tendermint.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade github.com/tendermint/tendermint to 0.34.9 or later.","what":"GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p is a vulnerability in github.com/tendermint/tendermint, published on 20 Dec 2021. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p is a vulnerability in github.com/tendermint/tendermint, published on 20 Dec 2021. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- github.com/tendermint/tendermint (Go): affected from 0.34.0; fixed in 0.34.9\n- github.com/tendermint/tendermint (Go): affected from 0.34.0; fixed in 0.34.9\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p/index.md)","id":"GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p/index.md","name":"GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["data_modify","security_bypass"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Tendermint consensus library","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Tendermint light clients fail to detect forward lunatic attacks, potentially allowing malicious validators to cause loss of funds via IBC.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"business_logic"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"_The root cause of this security vulnerability is in the Tendermint specification, and this advisory is a duplicate of https://github.com/tendermint/spec/security/advisories/GHSA-jqfc-687g-59pw._\n\n### Impact\nTendermint light clients running versions 0.34.0 to 0.34.8 are unable to detect and punish a new kind of attack. We’re calling this a “forward lunatic attack,” or FLA. The severity of this vulnerability is _moderate_. \n\nNote that an FLA cannot be successfully executed unless there are already ⅓+ Byzantine validators, and therefore outside of Tendermint’s security model; however, it is important to be able to detect and punish these kinds of attacks in order to incentivize correct behavior.\n\nIn an FLA, an attacking validator (with ⅓+ voting power) signs commit messages for arbitrary application state associated with a block height that hasn’t been seen yet, hence the name “forward lunatic attacks.” A malicious validator effectively executes a [lunatic attack](https://docs.tendermint.com/master/spec/light-client/accountability/#the-misbehavior-of-faulty-validators), but signs messages for a target block that is higher than the current block. This can be dangerous: Typically, misbehavior evidence is only created when there are conflicting blocks at the same height, but by targeting a block height that is far “ahead” of the current chain height, it’s possible that the chain will not produce a (conflicting) block at the target height in time to create evidence. \n\nPrior to Tendermint v0.34.9, the light client could accept a bad header from its primary witness, and would not be able to form evidence of this deception, even if all the secondary witnesses were correct. Because the light client is responsible for verifying cross-chain state for IBC, a successful FLA could result in loss of funds. However, it is important to note that FLAs are only possible outside the Tendermint security model. \n\nAll FLAs, attempted and successful, leave traces of provable misbehavior on-chain. A faulty header contains signatures from the faulty validator, and even in unpatched versions of Tendermint Core, networks could use social consensus (off-chain action) to recover the network. The patches introduced in Tendermint Core v0.34.9 handle all evidence automatically and on-chain. \n\nNote that this fix also allows for successful automatic reporting of FLAs, even after a chain halt. By adding a time to FetchBlock, light clients effectively have a backup way to determine if a halted chain should have continued, and it will be able to submit evidence as soon as the chain resumes. \n\n### Patches\nThis problem has been patched in Tendermint Core v0.34.9. \n\n### Workarounds\nThere are no workarounds. All users are recommended to upgrade to Tendermint Core v0.34.9 at their earliest possible convenience. \n\n### Credits\n\nThank you to @MaximilianDiez for originally surfacing this issue, and to @cmwaters, @josef-widder, and @milosevic for creating fixes at both the implementation and specification level.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [tendermint/tendermint](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint)\n* Email us at [security@tendermint.com](mailto:security@tendermint.com)","ecosystems":["Go"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"Signature verification failure in Tendermint","id":"GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"Go","product":null,"products":[],"type":"business_logic","year":"2021"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"Go","fixed":["0.34.9"],"introduced":["0.34.0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"github.com/tendermint/tendermint","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p"},{"ecosystem":"Go","fixed":["0.34.9"],"introduced":["0.34.0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"github.com/tendermint/tendermint","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/tendermint/tendermint","source":"GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p"}],"products":null,"published":"2021-12-20","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Tendermint light clients fail to detect forward lunatic attacks, potentially allowing malicious validators to cause loss of funds via IBC.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p/"}