{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including openclaw.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade openclaw to 2026.2.26 or later.","what":"GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6 is a vulnerability in openclaw, published on 3 Mar 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6 is a vulnerability in openclaw, published on 3 Mar 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- openclaw (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 2026.2.26\n- openclaw (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 2026.2.26\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6/index.md)","id":"GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6/index.md","name":"GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["security_bypass"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":true,"product_category":"Node.js voice-call library","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Attackers can bypass replay detection in OpenClaw's Twilio webhook by mutating unsigned headers, allowing replayed events to be processed as fresh.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"security_feature_bypass"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"### Summary\nThe voice-call Twilio webhook path accepted replay/dedupe identity from unsigned request metadata (`i-twilio-idempotency-token`), enabling replayed signed requests to bypass replay detection and manager dedupe by mutating only that header.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.25` (latest published npm version at triage time)\n- Fixed on `main`: commit `1aadf26f9acc399affabd859937a09468a9c5cb4`\n- Planned patched npm version: `2026.2.26`\n\n### Impact\nDeployments using the optional `voice-call` Twilio webhook path could accept replayed webhook events as fresh events when an attacker had one valid signed request and changed only the unsigned idempotency header.\n\n### Technical Details\nThe fix removes unsigned-header trust from Twilio replay/dedupe identity and binds replay/manager dedupe to authenticated request material. It also threads a verified request identity through provider parsing so dedupe uses verification-derived identity rather than mutable headers.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `1aadf26f9acc399affabd859937a09468a9c5cb4`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.26`). After the npm release is published, this advisory can be published without additional version-field edits.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.","ecosystems":["npm"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"OpenClaw's voice-call Twilio replay dedupe now bound to authenticated webhook identity","id":"GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"npm","product":null,"products":[],"type":"security_feature_bypass","year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["2026.2.26"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"openclaw","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6"},{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["2026.2.26"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"openclaw","purl":"pkg:npm/openclaw","source":"GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-03-03","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Attackers can bypass replay detection in OpenClaw's Twilio webhook by mutating unsigned headers, allowing replayed events to be processed as fresh.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6/"}