GHSA-h4g2-xfmw-q2c9 Clauster: Non-loopback deployments can serve the dashboard unauthenticated when auth.enabled is unset

Not scored Published

Unauthenticated attackers can execute code and escalate privileges on non-loopback deployments if auth.enabled is unset, despite password configuration.

Exploited in the wild
Not known
Login needed
Not needed
Attackable
Over the internet
Victim action needed
Not needed
Fix
Available

What is GHSA-h4g2-xfmw-q2c9?

GHSA-h4g2-xfmw-q2c9 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in clauster, published on 10 Jul 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.

Official description

Summary

A Clauster instance bound to a non-loopback address (e.g. 0.0.0.0 or a LAN IP) can serve the entire dashboard and its API without any authentication — even when the operator has configured a password — if auth.enabled is left at its default (false). The operator believes the instance is password-protected; in reality every request is served unauthenticated.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the instance gains full control of the dashboard: list projects, spawn/stop claude remote-control bridges in any project directory, edit CLAUDE.md, read bridge logs, and (where configured) clone repositories. Because bridges run Claude Code against the host's project directories, this is effectively remote code execution in those projects.

Loopback (127.0.0.1) deployments need no auth by design and are not affected.

Affected configurations

All released versions (≤ 0.2.1) where all of the following hold:

  • host is a non-loopback address, and
  • auth.password_required: true and/or auth.reverse_proxy.enabled: true is set, and
  • auth.enabled is left at its default false.

Docker deployments are affected: the image binds 0.0.0.0, and the previously-documented docker run command did not set auth.enabled.

Root cause

Two layers checked different flags:

  • The runtime auth guard enforces authentication only when config.auth.enabled is true; when false it passes every request through unauthenticated.
  • The config validator, for a non-loopback bind, required only one of auth.password_required / auth.reverse_proxy.enabled / auth.allow_unauthenticated_network — not auth.enabled. So a config with a password but enabled=false validated, started, and enforced nothing.

Proof of concept

With host: 0.0.0.0, auth.password_required: true, a valid auth.password_hash, and auth.enabled unset:

curl http://<host>:7621/api/instances

returns 200 with the full instance list and no credentials. Setting auth.enabled: true returns 401.

Patches

An upcoming patch release makes the config validator fail closed: a non-loopback bind is refused unless authentication is actually enforced — auth.enabled: true together with auth.password_required (+ a hash) or auth.reverse_proxy.enabled, or the explicit auth.allow_unauthenticated_network opt-out. The README, clauster.yml.example, and Docker docs were corrected to match.

Workaround

On any non-loopback deployment, set auth.enabled: true in clauster.yml (or CLAUSTER_AUTH_ENABLED=true) alongside your existing auth.password_required + hash (or reverse-proxy) settings. Alternatively, bind to loopback only and reach it via an SSH tunnel or a trusted authenticating reverse proxy.

Credit

Found during an internal security review.

Which versions are affected by GHSA-h4g2-xfmw-q2c9?

2 open source packages ship an affected version, including clauster.

PackageAffectedFixed in
clauster PyPIAll versions0.2.2
clauster PyPIAll versions0.2.2

How do I fix GHSA-h4g2-xfmw-q2c9?

Upgrade clauster to 0.2.2 or later.

Upgrade, and rotate credentials and sessions that may have been exposed. More about Authentication bypass.

Is GHSA-h4g2-xfmw-q2c9 being exploited?

There is no known exploitation of GHSA-h4g2-xfmw-q2c9 in the wild and no public exploit code.

Sources

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