GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j nono-cli'scregistry pack verification can fail open when provenance metadata is absent

Not scored Published

Attackers can bypass provenance verification in nono-cli by removing metadata, allowing unverified packs with host-executing hooks to run.

Exploited in the wild
Not known
Login needed
Not needed
Attackable
Local or same network only
Victim action needed
Not needed
Fix
Available

What is GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j?

GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j is a vulnerability in nono-cli, published on 28 Jul 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim.

Official description

Summary

Registry-installed nono packs are expected to be verified from local provenance metadata before they are used. Two files are relevant:

  • ~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json
  • ~/.config/nono/packages/<namespace>/<pack>/.nono-trust.bundle

Testing shows that nono fails closed when a pack has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry. However, if the trust bundle is also absent, the same pack can load successfully. Deleting security metadata should not make a pack easier to run.

Affected behavior

Observed with always-further/claude:

  1. Delete ~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json.

    Result:

    nono: Package verification failed for always-further/claude: pack 'always-further/claude' has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry - reinstall with: nono pull always-further/claude --force
    
  2. Delete ~/.config/nono/packages/always-further/claude/.nono-trust.bundle.

    Result: the profile loads successfully.

  3. Restore .nono-trust.bundle while the lockfile is still absent.

    Result:

    nono: Package verification failed for always-further/claude: pack 'always-further/claude' has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry - reinstall with: nono pull always-further/claude --force
    

Impact

If both the lockfile entry and trust bundle are absent, nono may accept an installed registry pack without artifact hash verification or provenance verification.

This is especially important for pack-provided session hooks, because session hooks execute on the host outside the sandbox. A pack that contributes host-executed code should not run unless nono can verify that the code is a locked and trusted pack artifact.

Root cause

verify_profile_packs treats the lockfile entry as optional. Existing code fails when a trust bundle exists without a matching lockfile entry, but when the trust bundle is absent too, there is no equivalent hard failure.

That creates a fail-open state:

  • lockfile entry missing
  • trust bundle missing
  • pack directory still present
  • profile can load

For any registry pack selected for execution, require both:

  1. A matching lockfile entry in ~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json.
  2. A present and valid .nono-trust.bundle in the installed pack directory.

If either is missing, fail closed with a reinstall instruction, for example:

reinstall with: nono pull <namespace>/<pack> --force

This keeps verification monotonic: removing provenance metadata cannot downgrade a verification failure into a successful launch.

Which versions are affected by GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j?

2 open source packages ship an affected version, including nono-cli.

PackageAffectedFixed in
nono-cli crates.ioAll versions0.61.3
nono-cli crates.ioAll versions0.61.3

How do I fix GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j?

Upgrade nono-cli to 0.61.3 or later.

Is GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j being exploited?

There is no known exploitation of GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j in the wild and no public exploit code.

Sources

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