{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including nono-cli.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade nono-cli to 0.61.3 or later.","what":"GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j is a vulnerability in nono-cli, published on 28 Jul 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j is a vulnerability in nono-cli, published on 28 Jul 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- nono-cli (crates.io): affected all versions; fixed in 0.61.3\n- nono-cli (crates.io): affected all versions; fixed in 0.61.3\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j/index.md)","id":"GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j/index.md","name":"GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"developer_tool","fix_type":"patch","impacts":["code_execution","security_bypass"],"network_reachable":"adjacent_or_local","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"nono-cli package manager","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Attackers can bypass provenance verification in nono-cli by removing metadata, allowing unverified packs with host-executing hooks to run.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"security_feature_bypass"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"## Summary\n\nRegistry-installed nono packs are expected to be verified from local provenance metadata before they are used. Two files are relevant:\n\n- `~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json`\n- `~/.config/nono/packages/\u003cnamespace\u003e/\u003cpack\u003e/.nono-trust.bundle`\n\nTesting shows that nono fails closed when a pack has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry. However, if the trust bundle is also absent, the same pack can load successfully. Deleting security metadata should not make a pack easier to run.\n\n## Affected behavior\n\nObserved with `always-further/claude`:\n\n1. Delete `~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json`.\n\n   Result:\n\n   ```text\n   nono: Package verification failed for always-further/claude: pack 'always-further/claude' has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry - reinstall with: nono pull always-further/claude --force\n   ```\n\n2. Delete `~/.config/nono/packages/always-further/claude/.nono-trust.bundle`.\n\n   Result: the profile loads successfully.\n\n3. Restore `.nono-trust.bundle` while the lockfile is still absent.\n\n   Result:\n\n   ```text\n   nono: Package verification failed for always-further/claude: pack 'always-further/claude' has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry - reinstall with: nono pull always-further/claude --force\n   ```\n\n## Impact\n\nIf both the lockfile entry and trust bundle are absent, nono may accept an installed registry pack without artifact hash verification or provenance verification.\n\nThis is especially important for pack-provided session hooks, because session hooks execute on the host outside the sandbox. A pack that contributes host-executed code should not run unless nono can verify that the code is a locked and trusted pack artifact.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`verify_profile_packs` treats the lockfile entry as optional. Existing code fails when a trust bundle exists without a matching lockfile entry, but when the trust bundle is absent too, there is no equivalent hard failure.\n\nThat creates a fail-open state:\n\n- lockfile entry missing\n- trust bundle missing\n- pack directory still present\n- profile can load\n\n## Recommended fix\n\nFor any registry pack selected for execution, require both:\n\n1. A matching lockfile entry in `~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json`.\n2. A present and valid `.nono-trust.bundle` in the installed pack directory.\n\nIf either is missing, fail closed with a reinstall instruction, for example:\n\n```text\nreinstall with: nono pull \u003cnamespace\u003e/\u003cpack\u003e --force\n```\n\nThis keeps verification monotonic: removing provenance metadata cannot downgrade a verification failure into a successful launch.","ecosystems":["crates.io"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"nono-cli'scregistry pack verification can fail open when provenance metadata is absent","id":"GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"crates.io","product":null,"products":[],"type":"security_feature_bypass","year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","fixed":["0.61.3"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"nono-cli","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j"},{"ecosystem":"crates.io","fixed":["0.61.3"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"nono-cli","purl":"pkg:cargo/nono-cli","source":"GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-07-28","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Attackers can bypass provenance verification in nono-cli by removing metadata, allowing unverified packs with host-executing hooks to run.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j/"}