{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including openclaw.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade openclaw to 2026.2.25 or later.","what":"GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf is a missing authorization vulnerability in openclaw, published on 3 Mar 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf is a missing authorization vulnerability in openclaw, published on 3 Mar 2026. Any signed-in user can exploit it over the network, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- openclaw (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 2026.2.25\n- openclaw (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 2026.2.25\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf/index.md)","id":"GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf/index.md","name":"GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["data_modify","security_bypass"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"MS Teams integration library","requires_auth":"low_privilege","summary":"Attackers can manipulate pending file uploads across different MS Teams conversations by exploiting missing conversation binding checks in the OpenClaw library.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"missing_authorization"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"### Summary\nIn `openclaw` MS Teams file-consent flow, pending uploads were authorized by `uploadId` alone. `fileConsent/invoke` did not verify the invoke conversation against the conversation that created the pending upload.\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker who obtained a valid `uploadId` within TTL could trigger cross-conversation upload completion (accept path) or cancel a victim pending upload (decline path).\n\n### Technical Details\n- Pending uploads stored `conversationId`, but invoke handling consumed by `uploadId` only.\n- The invoke path did not enforce conversation binding before `uploadToConsentUrl(...)` and pending-upload removal.\n- Fix binds accept/decline handling to normalized conversation id match before consuming pending upload state.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published npm version (as of February 26, 2026): `2026.2.24`\n- Vulnerable range: `\u003c= 2026.2.24`\n- Patched in release: `2026.2.25`\n\n### Remediation\nUpgrade to `openclaw` `2026.2.25` (or later) once published.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `347f7b9550064f5f5b33c6e07f64e85b9657b6f1`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the release (`2026.2.25`). Advisory published with npm release `2026.2.25`.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.","ecosystems":["npm"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"In `openclaw` MS Teams file-consent flow, pending uploads were authorized by `uploadId` alone.","id":"GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"npm","product":null,"products":[],"type":"missing_authorization","year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["2026.2.25"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"openclaw","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf"},{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["2026.2.25"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"openclaw","purl":"pkg:npm/openclaw","source":"GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-03-03","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Attackers can manipulate pending file uploads across different MS Teams conversations by exploiting missing conversation binding checks in the OpenClaw library.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf/"}