# GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6: WebauthnAuthenticator leaks sensitive HTTP headers through INFO-level logs

> The WebauthnAuthenticator library logs full HTTP requests including sensitive headers, allowing attackers with log access to hijack sessions.

- **Severity:** Not scored
- **Exploited in the wild:** Not known
- **Login needed:** Not needed
- **Attackable:** Over the internet
- **Victim action needed:** Not needed
- **Fix available:** Yes
- **Published:** 26 Jun 2026

## What is GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6?

GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6 is a vulnerability in web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle, published on 26 Jun 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.

### Official description

## Impact

`Webauthn\Bundle\Security\Http\Authenticator\WebauthnAuthenticator` logs the full `Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request` object inside the log context of both `onAuthenticationSuccess()` and `onAuthenticationFailure()` at INFO level:

```php
$this->logger->info('User has been authenticated successfully with Webauthn.', [
    'request' => $request,
    'firewallName' => $firewallName,
    'identifier' => $token->getUserIdentifier(),
]);

$this->logger->info('Webauthn authentication request failed.', [
    'request' => $request,
    'exception' => $exception,
]);
```

`Request::__toString()` returns the raw HTTP message, including every request header. As soon as the configured logger normalises or stringifies the context (default behaviour for `LineFormatter`, `JsonFormatter` via `NormalizerFormatter`, etc.), sensitive headers such as `Cookie` (session identifier), `Authorization` and any custom auth header are written to the log stream in clear text.

Applications that forward logs to centralised platforms (ELK, Splunk, Datadog and similar) are particularly exposed: log access is typically broader than application access, which can allow log readers to hijack authenticated sessions.

## Affected versions

Every release prior to 5.3.4 is affected.

## Patches

The fix removes the full `Request` object from the log context and keeps only non-sensitive fields (request path, method, firewall name, user identifier). It is shipped in 5.3.4. Older branches will not receive a backport; users on those branches should upgrade to 5.3.4+ or apply one of the workarounds below.

## Workarounds

Until the upgrade is applied, projects can:

1. Raise the minimum log level for the WebAuthn authenticator above INFO so these two log records are not emitted in production.
2. Configure their Monolog processor/formatter to strip the `request` key from the context of these records before they are written.

## Credit

Reported by Kay Joosten (Dawn Technology), maintainer of [Stepup-Webauthn](https://github.com/OpenConext/Stepup-Webauthn).

## Which versions are affected by GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6?

2 open source packages ship an affected version, including web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle.


| Package | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle` | Packagist | All versions | 5.3.4 |
| `web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle` | Packagist | All versions | 5.3.4 |

## How do I fix GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6?

Upgrade web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle to 5.3.4 or later.

## Is GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6 being exploited?

There is no known exploitation of GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6 in the wild and no public exploit code.

## Fix prompt for AI coding agents

```text
Check this codebase for GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6 and fix it if it is affected.

What it is: GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6 is a vulnerability in web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle, published on 26 Jun 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.
Exploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6 in the wild and no public exploit code.

Affected packages and fixed versions:
- web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle (Packagist): affected all versions; fixed in 5.3.4
- web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle (Packagist): affected all versions; fixed in 5.3.4

Task:
1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.
2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.
3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.
4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.
5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.

Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6/index.md)
```

## Sources

- OSV: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6

---
From sbomify Insights: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6/
Summaries are generated and may contain mistakes; the official description above is the record.