GHSA-rc6v-5rmx-w5mv arnika is affected by medium-severity issues in UDP rotation, PQC handling, and KMS TLS
Attackers can cause denial of service via UDP replay or bypass TLS verification in KMS communications, requiring MITM or local write access.
- Exploited in the wild
- Not known
- Login needed
- Not needed
- Attackable
- Over the internet
- Victim action needed
- Not needed
- Fix
- Available
What is GHSA-rc6v-5rmx-w5mv?
GHSA-rc6v-5rmx-w5mv is a vulnerability in github.com/arnika-project/arnika, published on 15 May 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.
Official description
Summary
Three medium-severity issues in arnika affecting the UDP key-rotation protocol, PQC key file handling, and KMS TLS client. All require specific preconditions to exploit and do not allow direct code execution or immediate key extraction. A self-contained PoC is attached.
Details
ACK timestamp not validated:
udpserver.go:185udpClient()verifies HMAC and packet type but never checksackPkt.Timestamp. A MITM can capture one ACK, drop all subsequent DATA packets, and replay the stale ACK indefinitely. Primary advances PSK each rotation, backup stays on key 1, tunnel breaks. No PSK knowledge needed. The server side already has this check, the client does not. Fix: mirror the timestamp check already present on the server side.Empty PQC key file silently accepted:
repositories/pqc.go:29os.ReadFilefollows symlinks. Empty file tobase64.Decode("") = []byte{}, nil. HKDF runs on the QKD key alone while arnika logs[OK] HKDF derivation completed for QKD+PQC key. Requires write access to the directory containingPQC_PSK_FILE. Fix: validate decoded key is non-empty before derivation; enforce parent directory permissions inSECURITY.md.InsecureSkipVerify: truehardcoded:repositories/kms.go:61KMS HTTP client unconditionally setsInsecureSkipVerify: true, overridingRootCAs.CA_CERTIFICATEis loaded but never consulted (dead code). Requires MITM between arnika and the KMS endpoint, which in typical deployments are co-located. Fix: remove the flag;RootCAsalready holds the correct pool whenCA_CERTIFICATEis configured.
PoC
See arnika_exploit.tar.gz. PoC shows observable behavior for each attack; the third one (KMS MITM) needs no custom code, any HTTPS proxy with a self-signed cert is enough.
Impact
Issues require network MITM or local directory write access to exploit. No direct key extraction or code execution. Primary impact is tunnel desync and silent security downgrade in hybrid QKD+PQC mode.
Which versions are affected by GHSA-rc6v-5rmx-w5mv?
3 open source packages ship an affected version, including github.com/arnika-project/arnika.
| Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
github.com/arnika-project/arnika Go | All versions | 1.0.1 |
github.com/arnika-project/arnika Go | All versions | 1.0.1 |
github.com/arnika-project/arnika Go | All versions | 1.0.1 |
How do I fix GHSA-rc6v-5rmx-w5mv?
Upgrade github.com/arnika-project/arnika to 1.0.1 or later.
Is GHSA-rc6v-5rmx-w5mv being exploited?
There is no known exploitation of GHSA-rc6v-5rmx-w5mv in the wild and no public exploit code.
Sources
Also known as GO-2026-5614.