{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including claude-faf-mcp.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-rr55-jp92-8wp2 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade claude-faf-mcp to 5.7.2 or later.","what":"GHSA-rr55-jp92-8wp2 is a path traversal vulnerability in claude-faf-mcp, published on 19 Aug 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, and only if a user opens a file or follows a link."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-rr55-jp92-8wp2 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-rr55-jp92-8wp2 is a path traversal vulnerability in claude-faf-mcp, published on 19 Aug 2026. It can only be exploited from the same machine or local network, and only if a user opens a file or follows a link.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-rr55-jp92-8wp2 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- claude-faf-mcp (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 5.7.2\n- claude-faf-mcp (npm): affected all versions; fixed in 5.7.2\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-rr55-jp92-8wp2/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-rr55-jp92-8wp2/index.md)","id":"GHSA-rr55-jp92-8wp2","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-rr55-jp92-8wp2/index.md","name":"GHSA-rr55-jp92-8wp2","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["data_read","data_modify"],"network_reachable":"adjacent_or_local","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"MCP server library","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Attackers can read or write arbitrary files outside the project directory via path traversal in claude-faf-mcp, exposing sensitive credentials and data.","user_interaction":"required","vuln_class":"path_traversal"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"### Summary\n`claude-faf-mcp` MCP tools accept a caller-controlled `path` argument and resolve it (`~` expansion + `path.resolve()`) straight into a filesystem read/write **without confining it to a trusted project directory**. An absolute path or `../` traversal is resolved and used as-is, so the server process can be made to read — and, via the file tools, write — files outside the intended `.faf` project context. The only remaining limit is OS file permissions.\n\n### Affected tools\nThe shared `getProjectPath()` chokepoint (feeding the `.faf` tools) and the general-purpose `faf_read` / `faf_write` file tools resolved a caller path straight into a read/write with no confinement (denylist-only); an absolute path still reached home-directory secrets, and `faf_write` could write outside the project.\n\n### Impact\nAn MCP client — or an LLM prompt-injected via attacker-controlled content (a web page, README, ticket, or `.faf`) into issuing a tool call — can read any file the server process can read: SSH keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`), cloud credentials (`~/.aws/credentials`), `.env` files, source, `/etc/passwd`; and `faf_write` could write outside the project. This is a sensitive-information-disclosure (CWE-200) primitive that far exceeds the declared `.faf` project-context scope. The server runs over stdio, so the read/write is reached by a crafted tool call (e.g. a prompt-injected agent processing attacker-controlled content).\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **5.7.2** by confining every caller-supplied `path` before any filesystem access (`safe-path.ts`):\n- Reads are restricted to `.faf` / `.fafm` context files, so non-context files (secrets) are refused regardless of directory.\n- General file ops (`faf_read` / `faf_write`) are confined to the project root (cwd + system temp; override with `FAF_ALLOWED_ROOTS`).\n- Paths are canonicalized through symlinks (closing the symlink bypass); absolute paths and `../` escapes are rejected; `callTool()` gains a central PATH-DENIED guard.\n\nUpgrade: `npm install -g claude-faf-mcp@5.7.2` (or one-click `.mcpb` install).\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, run the server only against trusted local projects, and set `FAF_ALLOWED_ROOTS` (patched versions) to a single project directory for a hard directory boundary.\n\n### Credits\nIdentified by the maintainers during a sibling-server audit prompted by the coordinated disclosure of the same class of issue in `grok-faf-mcp` by **Zhihao Zhang** (Worcester Polytechnic Institute).","ecosystems":["npm"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"claude-faf-mcp has an arbitrary local file read/write via unconfined `path` argument in FAF tools","id":"GHSA-rr55-jp92-8wp2","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"npm","product":null,"products":[],"type":"path_traversal","year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["5.7.2"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"claude-faf-mcp","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-rr55-jp92-8wp2"},{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":["5.7.2"],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"claude-faf-mcp","purl":"pkg:npm/claude-faf-mcp","source":"GHSA-rr55-jp92-8wp2"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-08-19","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Attackers can read or write arbitrary files outside the project directory via path traversal in claude-faf-mcp, exposing sensitive credentials and data.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-rr55-jp92-8wp2/"}