GHSA-v7pc-74h8-xq2h Hickory DNS failure to verify self-signed RRSIG for DNSKEYs

Not scored Published

Attackers can bypass DNSSEC validation by exploiting trust anchor logic, allowing them to spoof DNS responses and redirect traffic.

Exploited in the wild
Not known
Login needed
Not needed
Attackable
Over the internet
Victim action needed
Not needed
Fix
Available

What is GHSA-v7pc-74h8-xq2h?

GHSA-v7pc-74h8-xq2h is a vulnerability in hickory-proto, published on 7 Feb 2025. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.

Official description

Summary

The DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone.

Details

verify_dnskey_rrset() will return Ok(true) if any record's public key matches a trust anchor. This results in verify_rrset() returning a Secure proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. verify_default_rrset() looks up DNSKEY records by calling handle.lookup(), which takes the above code path. There's a comment following this that says "DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup", but this is not the case. To fully verify the whole RRset of DNSKEYs, it would be necessary to check self-signatures by the trusted key over the other keys. Later in verify_default_rrset(), verify_rrset_with_dnskey() is called multiple times with different keys and signatures, and if any call succeeds, then its Proof is returned.

Similarly, verify_dnskey_rrset() returns Ok(false) if any DNSKEY record is covered by a DS record. A comment says "If all the keys are valid, then we are secure", but this is only checking that one key is authenticated by a DS in the parent zone's delegation point. This time, after control flow returns to verify_rrset(), it will call verify_default_rrset(). The special handling for DNSKEYs in verify_default_rrset() will then call verify_rrset_with_dnskey() using each KSK DNSKEY record, and if one call succeeds, return its Proof. If there are multiple KSK DNSKEYs in the RRset, then this leads to another authentication break. We need to either pass the authenticated DNSKEYs from the DS covering check to the RRSIG validation, or we need to perform this RRSIG validation of the DNSKEY RRset inside verify_dnskey_rrset() and cut verify_default_rrset() out of DNSKEY RRset validation entirely.

Which versions are affected by GHSA-v7pc-74h8-xq2h?

5 open source packages ship an affected version, including hickory-proto.

PackageAffectedFixed in
hickory-proto crates.ioFrom 0.25.0-alpha.10.25.0-alpha.5
hickory-proto crates.ioFrom 0.25.0-alpha.10.25.0-alpha.5
hickory-proto crates.ioFrom 0.8.00.24.3, 0.25.0-alpha.5
hickory-proto crates.ioFrom 0.8.00.24.3
hickory-proto crates.ioFrom 0.8.00.24.3

How do I fix GHSA-v7pc-74h8-xq2h?

Upgrade hickory-proto to a fixed version for your release line: 0.25.0-alpha.5 or 0.24.3.

Is GHSA-v7pc-74h8-xq2h being exploited?

There is no known exploitation of GHSA-v7pc-74h8-xq2h in the wild and no public exploit code.

Sources

Also known as RUSTSEC-2025-0006.

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