MAL-2026-10031 Malicious code in @wagni_bot/orca-sdk (npm)
- Package
- @wagni_bot/orca-sdk
- Registry
- npm
What is MAL-2026-10031?
MAL-2026-10031 is a malicious package in @wagni_bot/orca-sdk, published on 9 Jul 2026.
Official description
The npm package @wagni_bot/orca-sdk is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a Orca (Solana DEX) SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope @wagni_bot on 2026-07-09.
Each package declares a postinstall lifecycle hook (postinstall: node postinstall.js) that executes automatically on npm install, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.platform()), walks the user's home directory (readdirSync/readFileSync) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cryptocurrency wallet files, and .env files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API sendMessage endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.
codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).
@wagni_bot/[email protected] ships a single file, postinstall.js, which is registered as the package main and as both the preinstall and postinstall lifecycle scripts. On npm install, this script executes automatically and (1) collects host identity (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), process.cwd()) and beacons a 'postinstall_executed' heartbeat, (2) reads installer-owned secrets from well-known paths — ~/.ssh keys, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.git-credentials, and the npm authToken from ~/.npmrc — and (3) recursively walks the user's home directory (up to 3 levels, skipping node_modules/Library/AppData/snap/cache) looking for crypto-wallet artifacts (id.json, wallet.json, keystore.json, mnemonic.txt, seed/recovery files, MetaMask/Phantom JSON, wallet.dat, etc.) and any.env /.env.local /.env.production file. All collected content is POSTed over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package name imitates the widely used Orca (Solana DEX) SDK, and the wallet target list is oriented at Solana developers whose ~/.config/solana/id.json is directly harvested. No legitimate SDK functionality is present; the package's sole purpose is credential and wallet theft at install time.
What should I do about MAL-2026-10031?
Remove the package from your dependencies and lockfiles, then rotate any secrets on machines where it was installed.