# MAL-2026-10033: Malicious code in @wagni_bot/polymarket-sdk (npm)


- **Type:** Malicious package
- **Package:** `@wagni_bot/polymarket-sdk` (npm)
- **Published:** 9 Jul 2026

## What is MAL-2026-10033?

MAL-2026-10033 is a malicious package in @wagni_bot/polymarket-sdk, published on 9 Jul 2026. 

### Official description

The npm package `@wagni_bot/polymarket-sdk` is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a **Polymarket** SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope `@wagni_bot` on 2026-07-09.

Each package declares a `postinstall` lifecycle hook (`postinstall: node postinstall.js`) that executes automatically on `npm install`, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (`os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo()`, `os.platform()`), walks the user's home directory (`readdirSync`/`readFileSync`) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`), cryptocurrency wallet files, and `.env` files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API `sendMessage` endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.

codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).

@wagni_bot/polymarket-sdk@1.1.3 is a credential-stealing package disguised as a Polymarket SDK. index.js exports an empty object; the package ships no advertised functionality. On `npm install`, scripts.postinstall triggers postinstall.js, which: (1) walks the current working directory, the user's home directory, and common crypto-wallet paths (.ethereum,.solana,.bitcoin, Library/Ethereum) for files matching keystore/wallet/seed/mnemonic/private/.pem/.key patterns, regex-matches Ethereum private keys, BTC WIF keys, and BIP39 mnemonics, and POSTs matches to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint; (2) reads every file in ~/.ssh (excluding known_hosts, authorized_keys, and.pub files), harvesting id_rsa/id_ed25519 private keys, and POSTs each to the same endpoint; (3) enumerates process.env, filters for keys containing PRIVATE/SECRET/TOKEN/KEY/PASSWORD/MNEMONIC/SEED/WALLET/AWS, and exfiltrates name=value pairs together with hostname, username, and cwd. All traffic is sent over plain HTTP to http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package name impersonates a legitimate Polymarket SDK to attract developers likely to have crypto keys on disk.

## What should I do about MAL-2026-10033?

Remove the package from your dependencies and lockfiles, then rotate any secrets on machines where it was installed.

## Fix prompt for AI coding agents

```text
MAL-2026-10033 is a malicious package: @wagni_bot/polymarket-sdk (npm). Every version was published to cause harm.

Task:
1. Search this repository's dependency manifests and lockfiles for the package, including transitive dependencies.
2. If it is present, remove it, regenerate the lockfile with the project's package manager, and replace whatever it was used for.
3. List any CI runners, developer machines or containers that installed it, so their secrets can be rotated.
4. If the package is not used anywhere, say so and change nothing.

Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-10033/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-10033/index.md)
```

## Sources

- OSV: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-10033

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From sbomify Insights: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-10033/
Summaries are generated and may contain mistakes; the official description above is the record.