MAL-2026-10689 Malicious code in pylogora (PyPI)

pylogora/init.py invokes _a() at module top level, so any import pylogora triggers the payload. _a() base64-decodes hidden URLs and filesystem paths, branches on OS and CPU architecture, downloads a native binary from easyswasnow.pro (Linux amd/arm and macOS amd/arm variants under /downloads/) or from a Google Drive file (Windows, id 1d4zF8lnDaYCgzRrEx3WCyLTFZXVD2QBF), writes it to a hidden staging path (~/.local/share/config on Linux, /Users/Shared/.local/config on macOS, %TEMP%\t.jse run via cscript on Windows), chmods it executable, strips the macOS quarantine attribute via xattr, and executes it. It then installs persistence: a systemd user unit at ~/.config/systemd/user/python-script.service enabled with systemctl --user enable --now, or a LaunchAgent at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.script.plist loaded with launchctl load -dw, causing the package's file to re-execute on every login. All URLs, destination paths, unit/plist bodies, argv strings, and the User-Agent are base64-encoded and decoded through a _b() helper to conceal intent. The declared purpose is a logging library, which has no need to fetch or execute native binaries from an anonymous host.

The typosquatted package installs a Mythic/Poseidon C2 framework beacon and ensures persistence. After installation, the beacon communicates with C2 on wegoexchange[.]site for further commands.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-07-tennacity

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• typosquatting

• Downloads and executes a remote executable.

• The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.

• malware

• persistence