{"answers":{"affected":"1 open source package ship an affected version, including syft-acp-util.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of MAL-2026-10767 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Remove the package from your dependencies and lockfiles, then rotate any secrets on machines where it was installed.","what":"MAL-2026-10767 is a malicious package in syft-acp-util, published on 16 Jul 2026."},"fix_prompt":"MAL-2026-10767 is a malicious package: syft-acp-util (npm). Every version was published to cause harm.\n\nTask:\n1. Search this repository's dependency manifests and lockfiles for the package, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If it is present, remove it, regenerate the lockfile with the project's package manager, and replace whatever it was used for.\n3. List any CI runners, developer machines or containers that installed it, so their secrets can be rotated.\n4. If the package is not used anywhere, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-10767/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-10767/index.md)","id":"MAL-2026-10767","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-10767/index.md","name":"MAL-2026-10767","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":null,"analysis_generated_by":null,"assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"The syft-acp-util package was published to the npm registry by user 'ada8877' (maintainer email k3mlol@proton.me) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the 'syft-acp' internal/private package naming convention (an ACP component library) of a target organization, so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency.\n\nThe package declares a preinstall hook (\"npm install @sentry/node \u0026\u0026 node examples/verify.js\") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io.\n\nEach impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical to the earlier 'click2ai' campaign, sharing the same Sentry organization (o4510485815754752) and a related ProtonMail maintainer identity, and differs only in the package name and target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511744089718784.\n\npackage.json declares a preinstall script that runs examples/verify.js. That script calls init() with a hardcoded DEFAULT_DSN pointing at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511744089718784 and sendDefaultPii:true, fetches the installer's public IP from Cloudflare's cdn-cgi/trace endpoint, sets it as the Sentry user ip_address, then deliberately triggers a TypeError so an event containing the installer's public IP, hostname, and stack context is uploaded to the author-controlled Sentry project on every `npm install`. Separately, src/index.js exposes an init() whose dsn resolution falls back to the same hardcoded DEFAULT_DSN when no dsn option or SENTRY_DSN env var is supplied, so consumer applications that call the advertised init() without an explicit DSN will route their captured exceptions and default PII to the author's Sentry project.","ecosystems":["npm"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":false,"headline":"Malicious code in syft-acp-util (npm)","id":"MAL-2026-10767","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"malicious","links":{"ecosystem":"npm","product":null,"products":[],"type":null,"year":"2026"},"n_packages":1,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":[],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"syft-acp-util","purl":"pkg:npm/syft-acp-util","source":"MAL-2026-10767"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-07-16","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"Apache-2.0","name":"OpenSSF Malicious Packages","prefix":"MAL"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":null,"url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-10767/"}