MAL-2026-11111 Malicious code in @wagni_bot/hyperliquid (npm)

The npm package @wagni_bot/hyperliquid is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a Hyperliquid SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope @wagni_bot on 2026-07-09.

Each package declares a postinstall lifecycle hook (postinstall: node postinstall.js) that executes automatically on npm install, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.platform()), walks the user's home directory (readdirSync/readFileSync) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cryptocurrency wallet files, and .env files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API sendMessage endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.

codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).

Package @wagni_bot/[email protected] was scanned across 3 files. No credential access, no install-time or import-time network activity, no lifecycle-hook execution, no obfuscated payloads, and no hardcoded attacker-controlled endpoints were observed in the package contents. Nothing in the scanned files indicates exfiltration, remote code fetch/execute, silent-relay, backdoor, or dependency-tree hijack directed at installers.