MAL-2026-11576 Malicious code in @nebula.js/sn-listbox (npm)

npm/@nebula.js/sn-listbox is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package's preinstall lifecycle script (node setup.mjs) runs automatically on npm install. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated (hex-mangled identifiers, per-scope string-property dictionaries hiding literals such as ldd, /etc/os-release, Alpine, bun, powershell, Expand-Archive), performs platform/libc detection, downloads the Bun runtime archive from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/<platform>.zip, extracts it to a temp directory, sets it executable, and then invokes it via execFileSync(bunBinary, [path.join(D, 'math_init.js')], {stdio:'inherit', cwd:D}). The invoked file math_init.js is a 727 KB bundle carrying the @bun/@bun-cjs header and obfuscator.io-style artifacts (string-array rotator function, multi-thousand-entry constants array, hex-mangled identifiers). Executing bundled code under a freshly-downloaded alternate runtime rather than Node evades Node-based supply-chain scanners; the payload's network and filesystem behavior are opaque. A Qlik listbox UI supernova has no legitimate need to fetch Bun and run an obfuscated bundle at install time, and this behavior does not appear in the legitimate @nebula.js/sn-listbox releases. This is an alternate-runtime dropper executing attacker-controlled bytes on the installer's host at npm install time.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.