MAL-2026-11595 Malicious code in @onereach/condition-builder (npm)

npm/@onereach/condition-builder is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package's preinstall lifecycle script (package.json runs node setup.mjs) downloads the Bun runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/<platform>.zip, extracts and chmods the platform binary, and uses it to execute a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a ~727 KB single-line, heavily obfuscated // @bun @bun-cjs bundle using a rotating string-array decoder and hex-named identifiers, and it is executed only under the freshly-downloaded Bun binary — Node-based tooling never resolves or runs its contents. setup.mjs itself is obfuscated in obfuscator.io style, with string-property indirection maps hiding literals such as ldd, /etc/os-release, bun, and the Bun download URL. A condition-builder UI library has no legitimate reason to install a second JavaScript runtime at npm install time solely to execute an opaque sibling script. The choice of an alternate runtime bypasses Node-based supply-chain review of the payload, and the obfuscation of both the visible dropper and the executed bundle is inconsistent with legitimate build glue. Installing this package causes arbitrary attacker-controlled code to execute on the installer's machine at npm install.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.