MAL-2026-11634 Malicious code in @onereach/si-copyable-text (npm)

npm/@onereach/si-copyable-text is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package declares scripts.preinstall = "node setup.mjs". setup.mjs is written with obfuscator.io-style hex-prefixed identifiers (_0x488df8, _0x52943e) and dispatch objects that indirect every string and call. Its behavior is to probe for a local bun binary and, if absent, download the Bun runtime v1.3.13 as a zip from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases into a tmp directory, extract it, chmod it executable (mode 493 / 0755), and invoke it on the shipped math_init.js. math_init.js is a ~727 KB file marked // @bun @bun-cjs containing a string-array cipher (WV8StW array-rotation, mixed-int/string table n7gIxM, decoder hc1jfK9) with no library exports; it is not referenced by the package's main/module entry (lib/component.js) and is unrelated to the package's advertised purpose (a Vue copyable-text UI component). The only path that reaches this file is the preinstall Bun-dispatch, which fires automatically on npm install. Executing an obfuscated ~700 KB payload under an alternate runtime at install time gives the author arbitrary code execution on the installer's host, and the alternate-runtime dispatch bypasses scanners that only inspect Node-resolved code paths.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.