MAL-2026-11703 Malicious code in @or-sdk/key-value-storage (npm)

npm/@or-sdk/key-value-storage is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The npm package declares a preinstall hook that runs setup.mjs, itself heavily obfuscated with _0xNNNN identifiers and per-function proxy objects mediating calls to execFileSync, https.get, unzip, and chmod. On install, setup.mjs checks for bun on PATH and, if absent, downloads a Bun runtime archive from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/<platform>.zip, extracts bun/bun.exe into a tempdir, marks it executable, and invokes it against the sibling math_init.js — a 720 KB single-line, control-flow-flattened, string-array-rotated bundle marked // @bun @bun-cjs whose contents cannot be read by standard Node-based tooling. The package advertises itself as a key-value-storage SDK, which does not require fetching a second language runtime to execute an opaque bundle at install time. This pattern — fetching an alternate runtime specifically to execute a bundled obfuscated payload during npm install — grants arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine while bypassing Node-based static analysis, and the payload's actual behavior is not observable without running it.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.