{"answers":{"affected":"1 open source package ship an affected version, including @servicetitan/admin-sql-table.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of MAL-2026-11813 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Remove the package from your dependencies and lockfiles, then rotate any secrets on machines where it was installed.","what":"MAL-2026-11813 is a malicious package in @servicetitan/admin-sql-table, published on 4 Aug 2026."},"fix_prompt":"MAL-2026-11813 is a malicious package: @servicetitan/admin-sql-table (npm). Every version was published to cause harm.\n\nTask:\n1. Search this repository's dependency manifests and lockfiles for the package, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If it is present, remove it, regenerate the lockfile with the project's package manager, and replace whatever it was used for.\n3. List any CI runners, developer machines or containers that installed it, so their secrets can be rotated.\n4. If the package is not used anywhere, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-11813/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-11813/index.md)","id":"MAL-2026-11813","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-11813/index.md","name":"MAL-2026-11813","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-5grm-2c2q-66hh"],"analysis":null,"analysis_generated_by":null,"assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"npm/@servicetitan/admin-sql-table is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the \"Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again\" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`\"preinstall\": \"node setup.mjs\"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading \"Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again\") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.\n\nThe package's package.json declares `\"preinstall\": \"node setup.mjs\"`, and setup.mjs is a javascript-obfuscator-processed script (`_0xNNNN` identifiers, string-array dictionary lookups) that at install time downloads a platform-specific Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/\u003cname\u003e.zip into a tmpdir, extracts it, chmods it 0755, and then execFileSyncs the downloaded Bun binary against a bundled sibling file `math_init.js`. `math_init.js` is a ~727KB Bun-CJS bundle (`// @bun @bun-cjs` header, rotating string array `n7gIxM`, char-code decoder `hc1jfK9`, shuffled identifiers) shipped with no accompanying source and unreachable from any library code path — its only invocation is under the freshly-dropped Bun binary during preinstall. Fetching a second language runtime and executing an obfuscated bundle under it on `npm install` delivers full-host code execution under whatever privileges the install runs with, and specifically evades scanners that analyze only Node-resolved code. Additional context: the package is published under the `@servicetitan/*` scope with no README, empty description, and peerDependencies on internal-looking `@servicetitan/design-system`, `@servicetitan/table`, `@servicetitan/react-ioc` — shape consistent with a dependency-confusion lure impersonating a ServiceTitan internal component.\n\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.","ecosystems":["npm"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":false,"headline":"Malicious code in @servicetitan/admin-sql-table (npm)","id":"MAL-2026-11813","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"malicious","links":{"ecosystem":"npm","product":null,"products":[],"type":null,"year":"2026"},"n_packages":1,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":[],"introduced":[],"last_affected":[],"package":"@servicetitan/admin-sql-table","purl":"pkg:npm/%40servicetitan/admin-sql-table","source":"MAL-2026-11813"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-08-04","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"Apache-2.0","name":"OpenSSF Malicious Packages","prefix":"MAL"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":null,"url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-11813/"}