MAL-2026-11839 Malicious code in @servicetitan/confirm (npm)

npm/@servicetitan/confirm is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package advertises itself as a React confirmation-dialog UI component, but ships a preinstall lifecycle hook that executes arbitrary code on the installer's host. package.json declares scripts.preinstall = 'node setup.mjs'. setup.mjs (heavily obfuscated with obfuscator.io-style identifier renaming such as _0x488df8/_0x52943e and per-call property-name lookup objects) downloads the Bun runtime v1.3.13 from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/, extracts and chmod +x's the bun binary, then invokes it to execute a sibling file math_init.js via execFileSync. math_init.js is a 727KB heavily obfuscated bundle using a rotated string-array (WV8StW push/shift rotator, ~1000-entry n7gIxM table, hc1jfK9 decoder) — the classic string-array obfuscation pattern. Neither setup.mjs nor math_init.js is declared in package.json's files manifest ("files": ["dist", "src"]); both are smuggled into the tarball root outside the author's declared publish surface. Running an obfuscated payload via a freshly downloaded alternate JS runtime at install time bypasses Node-based scanners and has no relationship to the package's advertised React UI purpose. Pattern is consistent with a compromised/hijacked publish.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.