# MAL-2026-11936: Malicious code in @servicetitan/titan-chat-ui-anvil2 (npm)


- **Type:** Malicious package
- **Package:** `@servicetitan/titan-chat-ui-anvil2` (npm)
- **Published:** 4 Aug 2026
- **Also known as:** GHSA-4vgm-vjfw-7x8q

## What is MAL-2026-11936?

MAL-2026-11936 is a malicious package in @servicetitan/titan-chat-ui-anvil2, published on 4 Aug 2026. 

### Official description

npm/@servicetitan/titan-chat-ui-anvil2 is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

Version 9.0.3 of this React chat-UI library adds an install-time dropper absent from prior releases. package.json declares `preinstall: node setup.mjs`. setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime (bun v1.3.13) from GitHub releases into a temp directory, extracts and chmod +x's it, then execFileSyncs the Bun binary with a sibling `math_init.js` (~727KB) as its argument. math_init.js is a single-line, heavily obfuscated blob using a rotating string-array (WV8StW), a mixed hex/string lookup table (n7gIxM), and a custom-alphabet base decoder (hc1jfK9) — a loader shape, not the readable React component code the package advertises. A chat-UI library has no legitimate need to fetch a second JavaScript runtime at install and execute an opaque payload under it; running the payload under Bun bypasses Node-based static analysis. CHANGELOG.md documents versions only up to v8.0.0 and describes the package as a pure React UI library with no native/runtime dependencies — the preinstall hook, setup.mjs, and math_init.js are undocumented additions in 9.0.3, consistent with a hijacked publish rather than a maintainer-authored release.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

## What should I do about MAL-2026-11936?

Remove the package from your dependencies and lockfiles, then rotate any secrets on machines where it was installed.

## Fix prompt for AI coding agents

```text
MAL-2026-11936 is a malicious package: @servicetitan/titan-chat-ui-anvil2 (npm). Every version was published to cause harm.

Task:
1. Search this repository's dependency manifests and lockfiles for the package, including transitive dependencies.
2. If it is present, remove it, regenerate the lockfile with the project's package manager, and replace whatever it was used for.
3. List any CI runners, developer machines or containers that installed it, so their secrets can be rotated.
4. If the package is not used anywhere, say so and change nothing.

Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-11936/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-11936/index.md)
```

## Sources

- OSV: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-11936

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From sbomify Insights: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-11936/
Summaries are generated and may contain mistakes; the official description above is the record.