MAL-2026-12042 Malicious code in platform-ui-island (npm)

The package's index.js unconditionally loads bridge.js on require. bridge.js downloads a platform-specific native binary from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev), assembled at runtime by string concatenation (e.g. ["oob-work","er.cf99-9","b3.workers.","dev"].join("")) to evade plaintext scanning. The payload is written to a deceptive path (dotnet_diag<hex>.exe on Windows, /var/tmp/.cache<hex> on Unix), chmod 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh or cmd. When HTTPS fails, _bridge.js falls back to reconstructing the payload from base64 chunks retrieved via DNS TXT queries to *.dl.well1.site subdomains (tin/tina/ldr/win.dl.well1.site), also string-concat obfuscated, and executes it via the same chmod+spawn path — a covert channel designed to bypass HTTPS egress filtering. Cover-story comments ("Shuffle endpoints to distribute load", "Cache validation") and a persistence flag file named.analytics_state frame the dropper as telemetry. lib/telemetry.js additionally ships the same fetch/decode/chmod/spawn primitives (81 KB, framed as an Analytics SDK) as a dormant secondary loader, though not referenced from index.js in this version. The package is advertised as visual UI components, which has no purpose-aligned reason to fetch or execute native binaries.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.