MAL-2026-12141 Malicious code in beaver-ui-actions-button (npm)
Malicious package
Published
MAL-2026-12141 is a malicious package: beaver-ui-actions-button (npm). Every version was published to cause harm.
Task:
1. Search this repository's dependency manifests and lockfiles for the package, including transitive dependencies.
2. If it is present, remove it, regenerate the lockfile with the project's package manager, and replace whatever it was used for.
3. List any CI runners, developer machines or containers that installed it, so their secrets can be rotated.
4. If the package is not used anywhere, say so and change nothing.
Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-12141/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-12141/index.md)
- Package
- beaver-ui-actions-button
- Registry
- npm
What is MAL-2026-12141?
MAL-2026-12141 is a malicious package in beaver-ui-actions-button, published on 5 Aug 2026.
Official description
The package is published as a React components library but ships no React code. On library load, index.js auto-requires setup.js, which constructs obfuscated hostnames via runtime string-concatenation — five Cloudflare Workers mirrors (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev) with tin/tina/ldr/win subdomains of dl.well1.site as DNS fallbacks — and per-OS asset paths (/pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe). lib/telemetry.js downloads the platform-specific binary, base64-decodes it, writes it to /var/tmp (or %TEMP% on Windows), applies mode 0755 via fs["chmod"+"Sync"], and executes it via require("child_"+"process"). Sensitive APIs (child_process, chmodSync, platform, hostname, userInfo, arch) and every destination hostname are assembled at runtime from split string fragments to evade static analysis. setup.js additionally computes a sha256 fingerprint over os.hostname, os.userInfo().username, process.cwd(), process.version, and process.pid, and transmits it as installId to the same Cloudflare Workers / dl.well1.site endpoints. Destinations are not publisher infrastructure, are not version-pinned, and are not hash- or signature-verified; the fetched binaries are attacker-controlled and their content can change at any time.
What should I do about MAL-2026-12141?
Remove the package from your dependencies and lockfiles, then rotate any secrets on machines where it was installed.