MAL-2026-13192 Malicious code in dolyame-ui-test (npm)

index.js unconditionally requires./platform on module load. platform.js reconstructs attacker-controlled hostnames via string-splitting (Array.join) to fetch a platform-specific native binary from one of four Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev). On HTTPS failure it falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel under wel1.ru subdomains (sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru), reading a chunk count from c.<domain> and reassembling base64-encoded payload chunks from N.<domain> TXT records. The fetched binary is written to /tmp or the Windows temp directory under decoy names (dotnet_diag*.exe,.cache*,.analytics_state), chmod 0755, and spawned detached/unref'd via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. A second, currently-unreferenced dropper in lib/telemetry.js duplicates the same fetch->chmod->spawn pattern behind a 'telemetry SDK' cover story, using require("child_"+"process") and fs["chmod"+"Sync"] to further obfuscate dangerous APIs. A UI package has no legitimate reason for this behavior; the destination obfuscation, DNS-TXT fallback, decoy filenames, and parallel staged dropper module together fingerprint a supply-chain attack delivering full-host remote code execution to any installer that requires the package.