MAL-2026-13340 Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-footer (npm)

The package's main entry (index.js) requires./compat, which at import time downloads a platform-specific executable from author-controlled endpoints assembled at runtime by joining string arrays: oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, and oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev. A fallback path reconstructs a base64 payload from DNS TXT records under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. A per-platform download map selects /pkg/package (linux_x64), /pkg/loader_mac (darwin), or /pkg/package.exe (win32). The fetched bytes are written to a decoy path (/tmp/.cache<hex> on Unix or TEMP/dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmod 0755'd, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c '<file> &' or cmd.exe start /b. lib/telemetry.js ships a second copy of the same primitive under an SDK/telemetry cover story: child_process is acquired via require("child_"+"process"), fs.chmodSync is called as fs["chmod"+"Sync"], and the payload is reassembled with Buffer.from(chunks,"base64") before being spawned. Hostnames, function names, and dropped-file names are constructed at call time to evade static inspection, and the persisted file uses hidden dotfile / Windows diagnostic-tool decoy names (.cache_<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe,.analytics_state). The package name presents as a payment/BNPL footer component, which does not match the observed behavior.