MAL-2026-14242 Malicious code in electro-session (npm)

[email protected] presents itself as 'Session utilities' (~170-byte README) but ships ~1MB of heavily obfuscated JavaScript under dist/ (index.js, cli.js, run-once.js, schedule.js), all produced by javascript-obfuscator (listed in devDependencies) using an RC4-encrypted string array, rotating index accessor, and self-defending/debug-protection wrappers that hide every string, module path, URL, and file path. dist/index.js imports node:sqlite, node:fs, node:os, node:path, node:child_process, node:crypto and requires./schedule; package.json pins engines.node to >=22.5.0 (the release that introduced the built-in node:sqlite API) and declares @vercel/blob as a runtime dependency. The combination — built-in SQLite reader + child_process + crypto + a cloud blob upload SDK, wrapped in anti-analysis obfuscation — matches the fingerprint of an infostealer that reads local SQLite-backed credential/session stores (browser Login Data / Cookies / History, wallet extensions, chat app session DBs), decrypts them via child_process-invoked OS primitives, and uploads them via @vercel/blob. dist/schedule.js (imported by index.js) and the sibling dist/run-once.js implement the standard schedule-plus-payload persistence split via node:child_process, consistent with registering a recurring OS task (schtasks/cron/launchctl) that re-invokes run-once.js. There are no npm install lifecycle hooks; the payload is triggered when a developer runs the electro-session bin (dist/cli.js prompts a bilingual y/yes/s/si affirmative — English plus Spanish, indicating targeting of Spanish-speaking developers — then constructs new Sessions({…:true,…:true})), or when any module does require('electro-session') and instantiates Sessions (run-once.js does so unconditionally).