MAL-2026-14425 Malicious code in auth-otp (npm)

Package advertises itself as a zero-dependency TOTP/HOTP library, but package.json runs node lib/core.js --setup as a postinstall lifecycle script. lib/core.js first checks for CI/audit/pack indicators (CI, CONTINUOUS_INTEGRATION, JEST_WORKER_ID, missing APPDATA/USERPROFILE/USERNAME/COMPUTERNAME, npm_lifecycle_script containing 'audit' or 'pack') and exits cleanly in those environments, so the payload only fires on real Windows developer machines. On a live host it enumerates Minecraft launcher account stores under %APPDATA% (vanilla launcher_accounts*.json, Lunar accounts.json, Essential microsoft_accounts.json, CurseForge storage.json, ModrinthApp DB/JSON/LDB files, launcher_msa_credentials*.bin) and extracts Xbox/MSA access and refresh tokens. It then scans Discord stable/canary/ptb/dev and Chromium-family browsers (Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera, Opera GX) Local Storage leveldb files, uses PowerShell + Windows DPAPI to unprotect each browser's os_crypt master key, AES-256-GCM decrypts 'dQw4w9WgXcQ:'-prefixed token entries, validates them against https://discord.com/api/v9/users/@me, and POSTs the working tokens as JSON embeds (with @everyone) to a hardcoded Discord webhook whose URL is reassembled at runtime from seven string fragments to defeat plain-string scanners, resolving to https://discord.com/api/webhooks/1532429233769419004/VE9zx782_hy5vedls0lwNRAVA1sUGb9Q2chTdXdrcmXuNzztkeXe7Ilbt36OjWaNnTXe. The same postinstall path downloads a JAR (fabric-api-boost-1.0.0.jar) from a similarly split URL pointing at github.com/ghysghqgHUJ/.jar/releases/download/v1.0.0/ — a personal GitHub account unrelated to the package publisher, with no hash or signature verification — and stages it into the victim's Minecraft mods directory as a second-stage payload.