MAL-2026-17462 Malicious code in echogen (PyPI)

On every import echogen, init.py invokes a _canary() function that performs an HTTP GET to a canarytokens.com tracking URL (https://canarytokens.com/feedback/traffic/tags/u7eeajm7pteo1ns0mzaijswht/payments.js) with a JSON query parameter containing host identifiers: Python version, container/k8s/CI environment flags (names only, not values), the parent process name read from /proc/<ppid>/comm, and a 6-segment prefix of the install path (which typically contains the OS username). The behavior is disclosed in the README and can be disabled via ECHOGEN_NO_CANARY=1. No credentials, environment variable values, file contents, or other sensitive data are collected. The destination is a third-party canary-token tracking service rather than a product-telemetry endpoint; because canary tokens are designed to alert an operator when accessed, each import of this library generates such an alert and the mild host identifiers above are disclosed to whoever controls that token. Import-time outbound network also breaks offline and air-gapped installs.

Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.

Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.

Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.

• The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.