MAL-2026-17491 Malicious code in focus-visible-polyfill-lite (npm)
Malicious package
Published
MAL-2026-17491 is a malicious package: focus-visible-polyfill-lite (npm). Every version was published to cause harm.
Task:
1. Search this repository's dependency manifests and lockfiles for the package, including transitive dependencies.
2. If it is present, remove it, regenerate the lockfile with the project's package manager, and replace whatever it was used for.
3. List any CI runners, developer machines or containers that installed it, so their secrets can be rotated.
4. If the package is not used anywhere, say so and change nothing.
Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-17491/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-17491/index.md)
- Package
- focus-visible-polyfill-lite
- Registry
- npm
What is MAL-2026-17491?
MAL-2026-17491 is a malicious package in focus-visible-polyfill-lite, published on 4 Oct 2026.
Official description
The package is advertised as a focus-visible polyfill but ships thunderboltRegistry.js, which impersonates Wix thunderbolt internal registry modules (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, documentManagementRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, and others) via a Proxy-backed export stub. When the module is required, an IIFE at the top of the file uses child_process.execSync to run host reconnaissance commands (id, whoami, uname -a, ifconfig/ip addr, cat /etc/hosts) and sends the command output along with a beacon (Node version, platform, pid) via plain-HTTP GET requests to a hardcoded attacker-controlled endpoint at http://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/ef9ea0e191006f3cc6670720c99c26f3. The package self-labels the beacon as 'rce-poc'. The shape is a dependency-confusion / typosquat payload: a benign-sounding public package shadows Wix-internal registry names so that a build pipeline resolving these names from the public registry executes the reconnaissance payload with the installer's privileges on module load.
What should I do about MAL-2026-17491?
Remove the package from your dependencies and lockfiles, then rotate any secrets on machines where it was installed.