MAL-2026-3684 Malicious code in @gusmano/reext (npm)
Malicious package
Published
MAL-2026-3684 is a malicious package: @gusmano/reext (npm). Every version was published to cause harm.
Task:
1. Search this repository's dependency manifests and lockfiles for the package, including transitive dependencies.
2. If it is present, remove it, regenerate the lockfile with the project's package manager, and replace whatever it was used for.
3. List any CI runners, developer machines or containers that installed it, so their secrets can be rotated.
4. If the package is not used anywhere, say so and change nothing.
Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-3684/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-3684/index.md)
- Package
- @gusmano/reext
- Registry
- npm
What is MAL-2026-3684?
MAL-2026-3684 is a malicious package in @gusmano/reext, published on 12 May 2026.
Official description
The npm preinstall lifecycle script (dist/scripts/preinstall.js, wired via package.json "preinstall": "node./dist/scripts/preinstall.js") reads the installer's ~/.gitconfig via iniparser.parseSync(home_dir+'/.gitconfig') and the OS username via os.userInfo().username, then issues an HTTPS GET to the hardcoded endpoint https://2tak.l.serverhost.name:1962/mobile/reext with osname, gitname, and gitemail supplied as query parameters. The code explicitly branches on
if (osname === 'xmarcgusmano') { server = 'http://localhost:1962' } else { server = 'https://2tak.l.serverhost.name:1962' }, confirming that the remote-host path fires for every installer that is not the author's own machine — a deliberate exfiltration path gated by the author's own username. The destination is not a documented vendor endpoint; it is an author-controlled third-party host the installer did not opt into. Separately, dist/scripts/postinstall.js resolves path.resolve(__dirname, '../../package.json') (the consuming project's own package.json relative to node_modules/@gusmano/reext/dist/scripts/) and rewrites it, deleting scripts.dev/build/test/watch/coverage, the entire scripts key, eslintConfig, devDependencies, and dependencies, then rm -rf's several dist subfolders — destructive, unauthorized mutation of the installer's project files. The combination (silent install-time exfiltration of personal identity data to an author-controlled host plus destructive rewrite of the consumer's manifest) is unambiguously harmful to installers.What should I do about MAL-2026-3684?
Remove the package from your dependencies and lockfiles, then rotate any secrets on machines where it was installed.