MAL-2026-3690 Malicious code in dlty (PyPI)
Malicious package
Published
MAL-2026-3690 is a malicious package: dlty (PyPI). Every version was published to cause harm.
Task:
1. Search this repository's dependency manifests and lockfiles for the package, including transitive dependencies.
2. If it is present, remove it, regenerate the lockfile with the project's package manager, and replace whatever it was used for.
3. List any CI runners, developer machines or containers that installed it, so their secrets can be rotated.
4. If the package is not used anywhere, say so and change nothing.
Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-3690/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-3690/index.md)
- Package
- dlty
- Registry
- PyPI
What is MAL-2026-3690?
MAL-2026-3690 is a malicious package in dlty, published on 12 May 2026.
Official description
Importing the
dlty package triggers an active data-exfiltration channel from the installer to third-party-controlled infrastructure. dlty/__init__.py imports dlty.dlt, which defines a class DataLeakTest whose class body contains threading.Thread(target=leak_data).start() — meaning the thread runs at class-definition/import time, not on instantiation. The target function leak_data (dlty/dlt.py) first performs an HTTP GET to https://www.google.de as a connectivity probe, then reads the environment variables RUN, PIPELINE, STEP and uploads them with a timestamp as a blob to the hardcoded Google Cloud Storage bucket data-leak-test via storage.Client().get_bucket('data-leak-test').blob(run).upload_from_string(...). This uses the installer's ambient GCP credentials (Application Default Credentials) to write installer-side environment variables (commonly CI/CD metadata) to author-controlled storage. Exceptions are swallowed with a reassuring print, and the exfiltration is placed in a class body rather than init to make it less visible during casual review. Metadata fields are placeholders (Example Author, pypa/sampleproject URL), the README is a single line, and the package name does not advertise any of this behavior. This is a one-way installer→attacker exfiltration path and meets the criteria for an active supply-chain attack.What should I do about MAL-2026-3690?
Remove the package from your dependencies and lockfiles, then rotate any secrets on machines where it was installed.