MAL-2026-3778 Malicious code in natazx (PyPI)
Malicious package
Published
MAL-2026-3778 is a malicious package: natazx (PyPI). Every version was published to cause harm.
Task:
1. Search this repository's dependency manifests and lockfiles for the package, including transitive dependencies.
2. If it is present, remove it, regenerate the lockfile with the project's package manager, and replace whatever it was used for.
3. List any CI runners, developer machines or containers that installed it, so their secrets can be rotated.
4. If the package is not used anywhere, say so and change nothing.
Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-3778/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-3778/index.md)
- Package
- natazx
- Registry
- PyPI
What is MAL-2026-3778?
MAL-2026-3778 is a malicious package in natazx, published on 14 May 2026.
Official description
On
import natazx, the package's top-level code executes several installer-hostile actions without consent: (1) it unconditionally overwrites the host's DNS configuration at /etc/resolv.conf (and the Termux equivalent) to point at 1.1.1.1/1.0.0.1 with aggressive timeouts — a system-wide change affecting every process on the host; (2) it runs pkill -9 tor and spawns a detached Tor daemon via start_new_session=True using a torrc written to /tmp/torrc, establishing a process that outlives the Python interpreter; (3) it shells out to pip install for five unpinned packages (colorama, requests, pycryptodome, urllib3, cfonts) bypassing declared dependencies (dependencies = [] in pyproject.toml), so the installer's environment is silently mutated with whatever the current PyPI releases are; (4) it fetches a JSON allowlist from a mutable GitHub main-branch ref (raw.githubusercontent.com/septianhdnatta/idd/refs/heads/main/device.json), builds a device fingerprint from serial number, build.prop, platform, uid, and timezone, and sys.exit(1)s if the installer's fingerprint is not on the author's list. The package's advertised function (main()) is a ToS-violating mass account-registration tool against Garena / Free Fire endpoints (100067.connect.garena.com, loginbp.ggblueshark.com, loginbp.common.ggbluefox.com) using hardcoded HMAC and AES-CBC keys, routed through 40 embedded HTTP proxy credentials on ten rotating IPs. The combination of import-time system-file destruction (resolv.conf overwrite), persistence (detached Tor daemon), silent environment mutation (unpinned pip installs), remote kill-switch (device-fingerprint allowlist on a mutable GitHub ref), and abuse-tool payload makes this package hostile to any environment in which it is installed.What should I do about MAL-2026-3778?
Remove the package from your dependencies and lockfiles, then rotate any secrets on machines where it was installed.