MAL-2026-4346 Malicious code in logger-draft (npm)
- Package
- logger-draft
- Registry
- npm
What is MAL-2026-4346?
MAL-2026-4346 is a malicious package in logger-draft, published on 22 May 2026.
Official description
Part of a multi-package malicious campaign by npm author toskypi, logger-draft is a companion package to eo-terminal in the same infostealer and remote access trojan (RAT) campaign. Both packages share the same actor, C2 infrastructure, and attack pattern, and are distributed together under a "terminal logging utilities" theme.
The campaign deploys a comprehensive payload via a postinstall hook that copies a large JavaScript agent to a persistent location disguised as MicrosoftSystem64 and registers it as a system service (systemd on Linux, LaunchAgent on macOS, scheduled task or registry run key on Windows). A sandbox check (CPU count and CPU model string) aborts execution in analysis environments. The install process exits cleanly with process.exit(0), leaving no visible error output.
C2 infrastructure: Primary WebSocket/HTTP C2 at ws://195.201.194.107:8010 (Hetzner Cloud, Germany). Stolen data is also exfiltrated to HuggingFace repository yszf984308/system-release via a hardcoded API token.
Capabilities (shared with campaign):
- Keylogger — keystroke and password capture with offline queuing
- Clipboard harvesting — 1,000 ms polling via platform-native tools
- Screenshot capture and live streaming
- Browser credential theft — Chromium-family and Firefox profile directories
- Crypto wallet exfiltration — 20+ desktop wallets
- SSH backdoor — exfiltrates SSH keys and injects attacker RSA public key into
authorized_keys - Shell history theft — 15+ history file formats across all user home directories
- Environment variable and
.envfile theft — targets cloud and CI/CD credentials at install time - Telegram session theft — full
tdata/directory exfiltration - Cloud credential theft — AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, Docker, GnuPG
- Recursive filesystem scan — certificate, key, and wallet files uploaded to HuggingFace
- Remote command execution and interactive terminal sessions
- Self-update via HuggingFace-hosted native binaries
[email protected] advertises itself as a terminal-color logger but ships a heavily obfuscated postinstall dropper (utils.cjs, 252 KB, obfuscator.io-style string-array + RC4 + self-defending wrappers) wired into package.json as "postinstall": "node utils.cjs". On install the script RC4-decodes a hidden BINARY_BASE_URL and HF_TOKEN, selects a platform-specific filename (linux-x64/arm64, darwin-arm64, win32-x64), HTTPS-GETs the binary with an Authorization: Bearer <token> header, writes it under the user's data directory with mode 0o755, and detached-spawns it. No hash or signature verification is performed, and the bearer-token gate means the source bytes are unauditable from the published package — the author can swap the payload server-side at any time. After dropping the binary the script installs cross-platform boot persistence: on Windows it creates a schtasks /SC ONLOGON task and an HKCU...\CurrentVersion\Run value pointing at a generated.vbs shim that re-spawns the binary hidden; on Linux it writes ~/.config/systemd/user/<unit>.service and runs systemctl --user daemon-reload && enable --now, plus an autostart entry; on macOS it launches the binary detached from a writable directory. Supporting deception signals: the README is titled terminal-logger-utils and instructs npm install terminal-logger-utils (mismatched name), publisher metadata is a bare handle with no repository/homepage/license, and the README claims 'Zero runtime dependencies' while package.json declares nine. Installer harm fires automatically on npm install in any developer or CI environment.
What should I do about MAL-2026-4346?
Remove the package from your dependencies and lockfiles, then rotate any secrets on machines where it was installed.