{"answers":{"affected":"1 open source package ship an affected version, including codebuff-cli.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of MAL-2026-4533 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Remove the package from your dependencies and lockfiles, then rotate any secrets on machines where it was installed.","what":"MAL-2026-4533 is a malicious package in codebuff-cli, published on 22 May 2026."},"fix_prompt":"MAL-2026-4533 is a malicious package: codebuff-cli (npm). Every version was published to cause harm.\n\nTask:\n1. Search this repository's dependency manifests and lockfiles for the package, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If it is present, remove it, regenerate the lockfile with the project's package manager, and replace whatever it was used for.\n3. List any CI runners, developer machines or containers that installed it, so their secrets can be rotated.\n4. If the package is not used anywhere, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-4533/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-4533/index.md)","id":"MAL-2026-4533","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-4533/index.md","name":"MAL-2026-4533","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":null,"analysis_generated_by":null,"assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"The npm package `codebuff-cli` impersonates the legitimate `codebuff` package (README copied verbatim from the official CodebuffAI project) and relays authenticated Codebuff traffic — API key, source code, context and chat messages — to an attacker-controlled backend instead of codebuff.com.\n\nThese three versions are not part of the existing OSV record MAL-2026-4533 (Amazon Inspector):\n- 1.0.4 and 1.0.10: the `bin` entry launches an embedded manipulated binary directly (no install hook); its default endpoint is `fireworks-endpoint--57crestcrepe.replit.app` (present in both the binary and its source-map).\n- 1.1.3: default backend `fireworks-api-backend.vercel.app`; downloads the payload from a foreign GitHub repository and disables TLS certificate verification for the launched payload.\n\nThe package was previously disclosed by Amazon Inspector (MAL-2026-4533); this report extends the confirmed-malicious set with three additional versions, determined by static code and dataflow review of the published npm tarballs.\n\nThis report is scoped to the additional versions (1.0.4, 1.0.10, 1.1.3) not yet listed, to avoid duplicating the existing record.\n\nThe package name `codebuff-cli` impersonates the legitimate `codebuff` npm package; the README is copy-pasted from the official CodebuffAI project (it even instructs users to run `npm install -g codebuff`), but the published artifact is an unofficial fork. Three concrete installer-side harms are present:\n\n1. Silent relay of user data to a non-publisher backend. README and the bundled binary configure the default backend as `https://fireworks-api-backend.vercel.app` (a personal Vercel deployment) instead of codebuff.com. Because this CLI is an AI coding agent, by-default usage transmits the user's source code, prompts, and command history to that endpoint.\n2. TLS verification globally disabled. `cli/bin/codebuff.cjs` line 201 spawns the codebuff binary with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`, disabling certificate verification for every HTTPS connection the binary makes (auth, backend, model providers). Combined with the redirected backend, this allows MITM of all transmitted code/prompts/credentials with no warning.\n3. Unverified binary fetch from a mutable personal-account release. If the bundled binary is missing, `cli/bin/codebuff.cjs` queries `https://api.github.com/repos/Marcus-Mok-GH/codebuff-cli/releases/latest`, downloads `codebuff-\u003cplatform\u003e-\u003carch\u003e` to `~/.codebuff/bin/`, chmods 0755, and executes it — with TLS verification disabled and no hash/signature check. The `latest` tag is mutable and the publisher is a personal GitHub user, not the CodebuffAI org.\n\nAttacker benefit is concrete and sustained: every prompt, code excerpt, and credential entered by an installer who followed the README's `codebuff` instructions is delivered to the publisher's infrastructure over an unverified TLS channel, with the additional ability to swap the executable at any time through the mutable `latest` release pointer.","ecosystems":["npm"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":false,"headline":"Malicious code in codebuff-cli (npm)","id":"MAL-2026-4533","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"malicious","links":{"ecosystem":"npm","product":null,"products":[],"type":null,"year":"2026"},"n_packages":1,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":[],"introduced":[],"last_affected":[],"package":"codebuff-cli","purl":"pkg:npm/codebuff-cli","source":"MAL-2026-4533"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-05-22","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"Apache-2.0","name":"OpenSSF Malicious Packages","prefix":"MAL"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":null,"url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-4533/"}