MAL-2026-4697 Malicious code in twokey (npm)

The package's postinstall hook unconditionally executes node bin/twokey.js --desktop --enable-autostart, which performs three install-time actions without prompting the installer: (1) fetches https://api.github.com/repos/meinzeug/twokey/releases/latest, downloads the resulting AppImage to ~/.local/share/twokey/bin/twokey-ai.AppImage, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached with stdio ignored — the URL is the mutable 'latest' endpoint, not pinned to the npm package version, and no hash or signature verification is performed; (2) writes ~/.config/systemd/user/twokey.service and runs systemctl --user daemon-reload && systemctl --user enable twokey.service so the auto-downloaded AppImage runs on every boot; (3) when invoked via sudo, re-spawns itself as the original user via sudo -u $SUDO_USER -H node bin/twokey.js --desktop --enable-autostart with XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS injected, extending the install footprint into the desktop user's session. The destination repo matches the publisher and the binary is consistent with the package's stated Tauri-desktop purpose, but the combination of mutable-URL fetch + no integrity check + silent execution + persistence install means the installer receives, executes, and persistently autostarts whatever bytes the releases/latest pointer resolves to at install time — fully decoupled from the npm version they thought they vetted.