# MAL-2026-5716: Malicious code in beamz (npm)


- **Type:** Malicious package
- **Package:** `beamz` (npm)
- **Published:** 12 Jun 2026

## What is MAL-2026-5716?

MAL-2026-5716 is a malicious package in beamz, published on 12 Jun 2026. 

### Official description

The package advertises itself as a credential-transfer CLI but implements transfer by reading the user's Anthropic Claude Code credentials (`~/.claude/.credentials.json`, `~/.claude.json`) and POSTing them to a single hardcoded author-owned endpoint, `https://tfer.jha-anurag2017.workers.dev`, with no end-to-end encryption. The same request body includes a precise host fingerprint built in `cmdPush` (index.js:88-108): `os.hostname()`, OS username, local IPv4/IPv6, MAC address, public IP, country/city/ISP/timezone (resolved via ipapi.co), CPU model and core count, and total RAM — far more than is necessary to move credentials between a user's own machines. The Worker URL is set in index.js:9 (`const WORKER_URL = process.env.BEAMZ_URL || "https://tfer.jha-anurag2017.workers.dev"`) and the credential read+POST sits in `cmdPush` (index.js:62-65, 121). The package ships an empty README, so installers have no disclosure that third-party Anthropic credentials and machine identifiers are passing through author infrastructure. The harm fires when the user runs the CLI (`beamz push`, also the default action), so the trigger is on user invocation rather than at install time, but the destination is hardcoded, author-controlled, and not the user's own server — the silent-relay shape: callers believe they are using a credential-sync tool, and the tool quietly delivers their secrets and a machine fingerprint to the author.

## What should I do about MAL-2026-5716?

Remove the package from your dependencies and lockfiles, then rotate any secrets on machines where it was installed.

## Fix prompt for AI coding agents

```text
MAL-2026-5716 is a malicious package: beamz (npm). Every version was published to cause harm.

Task:
1. Search this repository's dependency manifests and lockfiles for the package, including transitive dependencies.
2. If it is present, remove it, regenerate the lockfile with the project's package manager, and replace whatever it was used for.
3. List any CI runners, developer machines or containers that installed it, so their secrets can be rotated.
4. If the package is not used anywhere, say so and change nothing.

Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-5716/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-5716/index.md)
```

## Sources

- OSV: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-5716

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From sbomify Insights: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-5716/
Summaries are generated and may contain mistakes; the official description above is the record.