# MAL-2026-6418: Malicious code in leo-aws (npm)


- **Type:** Malicious package
- **Package:** `leo-aws` (npm)
- **Published:** 24 Jun 2026

## What is MAL-2026-6418?

MAL-2026-6418 is a malicious package in leo-aws, published on 24 Jun 2026. 

### Official description

The `leo-aws` npm package was compromised as part of the Miasma worm campaign targeting the LeoPlatform npm ecosystem. On June 24, 2026, 20 LeoPlatform packages were published within a 3-second window by a threat actor who had taken over the npm account `czirker` belonging to the LeoPlatform organization.

The malicious payload is triggered automatically during `npm install` via a `binding.gyp` file using node-gyp command expansion (`<!(node index.js > /dev/null 2>&1 && echo stub.c)`), which bypasses lifecycle script scanners. The replaced `index.js` (~5.2 MB, obfuscated with ROT-N + AES-128-GCM encryption) deploys a multi-stage worm with the following capabilities:

- Credential theft: Targets npm, GitHub, PyPI, RubyGems, Kubernetes, HashiCorp Vault, AWS (IAM keys, Secrets Manager, IMDS), 1Password, JFrog Artifactory, and SSH keys.
- AI tool targeting: Exfiltrates configuration files for Claude, Cursor, Gemini, and VS Code.
- Worm propagation: Enumerates npm packages and auto-publishes version bumps to spread to other maintainers in the ecosystem.
- GitHub persistence: Creates orphan `snapshot-<hex>` branches with fake "Dependabot Updates" workflows to maintain access after initial compromise.

Any system that installed this version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate all secrets immediately from a separate, clean machine. See the linked SafeDep report for full payload analysis, indicators of compromise, and remediation guidance.

The package contains a binding.gyp at the tarball root whose contents use GYP command-expansion syntax (<!(...) / <!@(...)) on line 6. npm implicitly runs `node-gyp rebuild` whenever a binding.gyp is present in the package, even without any declared install/postinstall script, and node-gyp's configure step evaluates <!(...) expressions as shell commands. This causes the embedded command to execute on every `npm install` of leo-aws. The package ships no native C/C++ source files (no.c/.cc/.cpp/.h), so the binding.gyp has no legitimate build purpose — its only effect is to run the embedded shell command at install time. This is functionally equivalent to a postinstall hook and is a well-known supply-chain attack technique for hiding install-time code execution from cursory script-field inspection.

## What should I do about MAL-2026-6418?

Remove the package from your dependencies and lockfiles, then rotate any secrets on machines where it was installed.

## Fix prompt for AI coding agents

```text
MAL-2026-6418 is a malicious package: leo-aws (npm). Every version was published to cause harm.

Task:
1. Search this repository's dependency manifests and lockfiles for the package, including transitive dependencies.
2. If it is present, remove it, regenerate the lockfile with the project's package manager, and replace whatever it was used for.
3. List any CI runners, developer machines or containers that installed it, so their secrets can be rotated.
4. If the package is not used anywhere, say so and change nothing.

Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-6418/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-6418/index.md)
```

## Sources

- OSV: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-6418

---
From sbomify Insights: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-6418/
Summaries are generated and may contain mistakes; the official description above is the record.