{"answers":{"affected":"1 open source package ship an affected version, including @marketfront/commonecommerce.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of MAL-2026-6771 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Remove the package from your dependencies and lockfiles, then rotate any secrets on machines where it was installed.","what":"MAL-2026-6771 is a malicious package in @marketfront/commonecommerce, published on 2 Jul 2026."},"fix_prompt":"MAL-2026-6771 is a malicious package: @marketfront/commonecommerce (npm). Every version was published to cause harm.\n\nTask:\n1. Search this repository's dependency manifests and lockfiles for the package, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If it is present, remove it, regenerate the lockfile with the project's package manager, and replace whatever it was used for.\n3. List any CI runners, developer machines or containers that installed it, so their secrets can be rotated.\n4. If the package is not used anywhere, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-6771/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-6771/index.md)","id":"MAL-2026-6771","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-6771/index.md","name":"MAL-2026-6771","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":null,"analysis_generated_by":null,"assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"The @marketfront/commonecommerce package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' (marketfront@tutamail.com) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover.\n\nThe package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved.\n\nThe decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails.\n\nThis package is a malicious install-time credential/host harvester wearing a fake corporate-telemetry cover story. On `npm install`, the `postinstall` lifecycle hook runs `scripts/postinstall.js`, a 162 KB obfuscator.io-style bundle that uses a shuffled string array with RC4+base64 decoders (`a0d/a0e/a0f`) to hide every literal, including all `require(...)` module names (`fs`, `http`, `https`, `dns`, `os`) and destination hosts. At install time it collects `process.env` in full, hostname/username/OS/CPU/arch, the npm user-agent, and named Windows env vars (`USERDOMAIN`, `COMPUTERNAME`, `APPDATA`, `LOCALAPPDATA`, `PROGRAMDATA`, `TEMP`, `NODE_OPTIONS`), plus reads local files via `fs.readFileSync` and directory listings via `readdirSync`. The collected data is RC4-encrypted and shipped over two parallel channels: (1) an HTTPS POST to a runtime-assembled host (`lpqgnt` builds `{hostname, port, path, method:'POST',...}` from decoded string-array entries), and (2) DNS-label tunneling (`oaulmd` chunks the encrypted payload with `/.{1,50}/g` and issues `resolve('\u003cchunk\u003e.\u003cidx\u003e.\u003crand\u003e.\u003chost\u003e')` queries against a hardcoded resolver) — a covert channel designed to bypass HTTP egress filtering. Before exfiltrating, the payload inspects `process.argv`, `process.execPath`, `process.env.NODE_OPTIONS`, and a wall-clock timing check to detect analysis environments, and defers execution behind a randomized `setTimeout`. The package presents itself as an internal 'Marketfront Platform Engineering' metrics client (author `platform@marketfront.io`, homepage `docs.marketfront.io`, README claiming 'anonymous telemetry to telemetry.marketfront.io' and instructing users to point `.npmrc` at `npm.marketfront.io`), but none of that infrastructure exists as a real organization — it is dependency-confusion cover. The advertised library API is non-functional: `dist/index.js` is a two-line stub re-exporting `../src/index.js`, and `src/` is not shipped, so the postinstall dropper is the only reachable code.","ecosystems":["npm"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":false,"headline":"Malicious code in @marketfront/commonecommerce (npm)","id":"MAL-2026-6771","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"malicious","links":{"ecosystem":"npm","product":null,"products":[],"type":null,"year":"2026"},"n_packages":1,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":[],"introduced":["0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"@marketfront/commonecommerce","purl":"pkg:npm/%40marketfront%2Fcommonecommerce","source":"MAL-2026-6771"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-07-02","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"Apache-2.0","name":"OpenSSF Malicious Packages","prefix":"MAL"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":null,"url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-6771/"}