{"answers":{"affected":"1 open source package ship an affected version, including logger-daemon-regex.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of MAL-2026-7017 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Remove the package from your dependencies and lockfiles, then rotate any secrets on machines where it was installed.","what":"MAL-2026-7017 is a malicious package in logger-daemon-regex, published on 5 Jul 2026."},"fix_prompt":"MAL-2026-7017 is a malicious package: logger-daemon-regex (npm). Every version was published to cause harm.\n\nTask:\n1. Search this repository's dependency manifests and lockfiles for the package, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If it is present, remove it, regenerate the lockfile with the project's package manager, and replace whatever it was used for.\n3. List any CI runners, developer machines or containers that installed it, so their secrets can be rotated.\n4. If the package is not used anywhere, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-7017/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-7017/index.md)","id":"MAL-2026-7017","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-7017/index.md","name":"MAL-2026-7017","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":null,"analysis_generated_by":null,"assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"The npm package `logger-daemon-regex` is a full-spectrum information stealer and remote-control agent disguised as a \"Node.js integration layer for Autodesk Forge\" (all bin names are `forge-*`).\n\nA `postinstall` lifecycle hook chains five scripts (postinstall-clipboard-event, ensure-dist, postinstall-durable-materialize, postinstall-bootstrap, postinstall-agent) that stand up a persistent background agent (via pm2 / an autostart CLI) on `npm install`, before the package is ever imported.\n\nThe agent scans the filesystem for a curated crypto-focused target list (shipped as `secret_filename_patterns.json`): wallet files (wallet.dat, *.wallet, keypair.json, new_keypair.json), seed phrases (*.mnemonic, *.seed, *.phrase), key material (*.pk/p8/p12/pfx/jks/keystore, UTC--* Ethereum keystores, id.json Solana keypairs), and general secrets (.env*, secrets.json, keys.txt) across chain directories (.solana, .ethereum, .bitcoin, .web3, .keystore). It also harvests browser-extension databases, captures keyboard input and the clipboard, takes periodic screenshots, and exposes a remote file explorer / control channel (relayServer/relayAgent/fsProtocol). Crypto-seed dependencies @scure/bip39 and tweetnacl corroborate the wallet-theft intent.\n\nHarvested data is archived and exfiltrated via Hugging Face Hub uploads (@huggingface/hub, using an hf_ token) and Discord webhooks.\n\npackage.json advertises the package as a 'Node.js integration layer for Autodesk Forge' but the shipped code is a full information-stealer / remote-access implant. On npm install, scripts.postinstall chains scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs, which (a) copies dist/ into a hidden per-user runtime prefix at \u003cuserdata\u003e/.logger-daemon-regex/runtime/v\u003cversion\u003e/ so the agent survives `npm uninstall`, (b) registers OS autostart against that hidden copy via cli-autostart.js, and (c) spawns a detached, windowsHide, unref'd node process running dist/cli-agent.js. The agent opens a WebSocket to a C2 host whose address is not present as plaintext: dist/deploymentDefaults.js reconstructs a 32-byte AES-256-GCM key by XOR-ing two obfuscated Uint8Array halves (DEPLOYMENT_KEY_A^DEPLOYMENT_MASK_A, DEPLOYMENT_KEY_B^DEPLOYMENT_MASK_B) and decrypts DEPLOYMENT_CIPHER_TEXT_B64 (with IV/TAG) into publicHost / relayPort / apiPort / defaultExplorerPassword, from which ws://\u003chost\u003e:\u003cport\u003e is derived at runtime. Once connected, the agent runs dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js, which walks POSIX '/' or every Windows drive and matches files by name and content against rules in dist/secretScan/contentScanner.js: checksum-validated BIP-39 mnemonics, secp256k1 private keys, WIF, BIP32 xprv/tprv/zprv, Solana 64-byte keypair JSON, env-style KEY/SECRET/PRIVATE/SEED/MNEMONIC/PASSWORD lines, and JSON wallet fields. Matches (with full secret material by default) are packaged into agents/\u003chostname\u003e/result.json and uploaded via @huggingface/hub uploadFiles to a Hugging Face repo, using an access token decrypted from CFGMGR_HF_CREDENTIALS_B64 / RELAY_HF_CREDENTIALS_B64 with the same XOR-derived bundle key. dist/shellHistoryScan.js separately enumerates ~/.bash_history, ~/.zsh_history, ~/.python_history, ~/.node_repl_history, ~/.mysql_history, ~/.psql_history, ~/.sqlite_history, ~/.lesshst, fish history, Windows PowerShell PSReadLine ConsoleHost_history.txt, Clink history, and Cygwin/msys homes, streaming records through syncClient to the same C2 relay. dist/hostInventorySend.js unconditionally POSTs hostname + os.type/platform/release/version + Node version to the same relay. dist/chromiumExtensionDbHarvest.js + dist/extensionDbHfUpload.js target Chromium/Chrome/Edge extension LevelDB stores (browser wallets, session cookies) and are enabled by default via FORGE_JS_AGENT_EXTENSION_DB_HF_UPLOAD='1' set in postinstall-agent.mjs's turnkeySpawnEnvOverrides. dist/index.js additionally re-exports relayAgent, windowsInputSync, clipboardEventWatcher, discordRelayUpload, and workerBootstrap, giving the C2 operator keyboard/clipboard capture, screenshot exfiltration (handleDiscordScreenshotUploadFromAgent), and arbitrary file upload. The near-duplicate bin entries (forge-jsx-explorer-*, forge-jsy-explorer-*, logger-daemon-regex-explorer-kill-agent) and CFGMGR_* / FORGE_JS_* env-var namespaces reinforce the Autodesk Forge / cfgmgr impersonation cover story.","ecosystems":["npm"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":false,"headline":"Malicious code in logger-daemon-regex (npm)","id":"MAL-2026-7017","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"malicious","links":{"ecosystem":"npm","product":null,"products":[],"type":null,"year":"2026"},"n_packages":1,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"npm","fixed":[],"introduced":[],"last_affected":[],"package":"logger-daemon-regex","purl":"pkg:npm/logger-daemon-regex","source":"MAL-2026-7017"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-07-05","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"Apache-2.0","name":"OpenSSF Malicious Packages","prefix":"MAL"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":null,"url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/MAL-2026-7017/"}